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ABSTRACT 
Tacitus began the Annals with the death of Augustus in order to emphasize the moment when the 
autocratic system of government he had established became a permanent fixture in the Roman state 
when it was passed on to his successors, the Julio-Claudian Emperors.
1
 Tacitus chose the annalistic 
form to present his history in order to record the major events of political, military and 
constitutional importance within these formative years of the empire.
2
 This thesis offers a 
historiographical study of Tacitus‟ Annals in order to demonstrate how he utilises the Roman army 
and its generals as a means of emphasising the political environment in these embryonic years of 
the empire. This study is valuable in that it shows how, by use of various literary devices, Tacitus 
gives his opinions of the emperors by contrasting their actions and behaviours with their generals 
and armies. His descriptions of res externae, the actions of the armies, is designed to counterbalance 
what he claimed was sorrowful res internae within the Roman state itself.  
Scholars‟ views on Tacitus qualities as an historian range from the belief that he was truthful and 
reliable to the view that the Annals was mostly a work of literature and of little value for historical 
fact. Woodman, Kajanto and Haynes argue that Tacitus‟ work was more a work of rhetorical 
invention, like that of the poets.
3
 Mellor likens him to such historical novelists as Tolstoy and 
George Eliot.
4
 Syme, Mendell and Martin express their belief that Tacitus was a reliable and honest 
historian.
5
 In this thesis, I examine Tacitus‟ style and language in order to show how his method of 
writing plays a crucial role in developing the themes of the Annals. Tacitus often uses rhetorical 
devices such as innuendo and obfuscation and plays with the structure of his narrative in order to 
make specific points about the emperors and their armies. Through a careful examination of these 
devices I will show how Tacitus uses the army and the Praetorian Guard to make a larger point 
about the nature of imperial power in the early principate. 
In the first chapter I will argue that Tacitus‟ account of the relationship between the senatorial 
generals and the emperors in the Annals exposes the tensions that were rife in the early years of the 
principate. I will do this through an examination of Tiberius‟ relations with Germanicus and other 
generals who were at war during his reign. The chapter will end with an examination of Corbulo 
and how his presentation in the Annals reflects on the emperor Nero. This argument will be 
developed further in my second chapter, which will examine the western legions. I will analyse the 
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Rhine and Pannonian mutinies that took place in the reign of Tiberius. There will follow a study of 
Germanicus‟ armies fighting in the wars in Germany, the campaigns against Florus and Sacrovir in 
Gaul and the revolt of Tacfarinas in North Africa, all of which were designed to reflect on Tacitus‟ 
portrayal of Tiberius. I will then turn to the revolt of Boudica which exposes Tacitus‟ views on 
peace and highlights his views on the debauchery that was rife in Nero‟s court. The third chapter 
will involve a study of the armies of the east. This will bring into prominence Tacitus‟ negative 
portrait of Nero who appears as a corrupt princeps, in contrast with the excellence of his general 
Corbulo. In this section Tacitus‟ uses the topos of luxuria to characterise the dissolute eastern 
legions before they are successfully disciplined by Corbulo. This will be discussed in detail. The 
final chapter will focus on the Praetorian Guard, which Tacitus saw as an army imposed on the 
senate and people of Rome. This study will include a detailed analysis of the Praetorian Prefects 
and show how their characterisation reflects Tacitus‟ perception of the emperors they served. By 
examining these aspects of the Annals, I will show that Tacitus utilises the armies, the generals and 
the Praetorian Guard in order to emphasise the problematic nature of imperial power in the early 
principate. 
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THE PORTRAYAL OF GENERALS AND ARMIES IN TACITUS’ ANNALS 
 
INTRODUCTION
6
 
 
AIM OF THE THESIS 
 
Tacitus wrote in book four of his Annals: 
That much of what I have recorded and of what I shall record seem perhaps insignificant and 
trivial to recall, I am not unaware; but no one should compare my Annals with the writings of 
those who compiled the affairs of the Roman people of old. Mighty wars, storming of cities, 
routed and captured kings […..] it was these which they recalled and had the freedom to 
explore. My work on the other hand is confined and inglorious; peace was immoveable or 
only modestly challenged, affairs of the city were sorrowful.
7
 
This is Tacitus‟ expressed view of the principate and the wars that he had in mind as he wrote the 
Annals. Tacitus claimed that his work was unimpressive as opposed to the works of his 
predecessors like Livy and Sallust, men who could report on the victories of generals like Scipio 
Africanus, Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar.
8
 However Tacitus is being disingenuous here. There 
were great victories during the period of the Annals, most notably the conquest of Britain, which is 
lost from our manuscripts. He is using this to show that this was the end of encomiastic histories 
such as those of Livy.
9
 According to Woodman, Tacitus approaches the introduction in this manner 
in order to present himself as the historian of disenchantment.
10
 Tacitus mourned the opportunity to 
portray the battles as of old. He was an admirer of the Republic in its heyday, and reminisces about 
it as he examines the feats of the armies that he wrote about, even as he bemoaned that „peace was 
immoveable or only modestly challenged‟ (imota quippe aut modica lacessita pax).11  At the end of 
the civil wars, the development of the principate under Augustus changed the old order by placing 
the army in the hands of one man, the princeps.
12
 It was no longer controlled by the senatorial 
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generals chosen each year from the consulars and praetors as under the Republic. It also allowed 
Augustus to develop such a military force as the Praetorian cohorts, a force that Tacitus saw as an 
army inflicted on the people of Rome.  
According to Saller, history is influenced by the author‟s purpose and the modern historian must 
take this into account when assessing his source material.
13
 As will be shown in this thesis Tacitus‟ 
purpose was to elucidate the difference between the excellence of the generals and the army as 
opposed to the corruption that he saw in the state. Such an assessment reveals that in the Annals  the 
campaigns and successes of the Roman Army and its generals function as a contrast to the problems 
that Tacitus saw in the principate, an imperial system in which freedom to write was „deterred by 
increasing sycophancy‟.14 Thus Tacitus situates himself in the realm of sceptical historiography in 
the tradition of his predecessors Sallust and Thucydides.
15
 As O‟Gorman writes, the method of 
these three historians, through the perversion of language, presents a symptom of a society in the 
midst of social and moral upheaval.
16
 This is what we find in the period after the death of Augustus 
and the troubled accession of Tiberius, and Tacitus‟ portrayal of the armies is designed to be a 
reflection of this disorder.  
This thesis will analyse the representation of the armies and generals in Tacitus‟ Annals. It will do 
this by examining Tacitus‟ style and use of language and is manipulations of the narrative form and 
content. Scrutiny of these aspects of Tacitus‟ work shows that Tacitus‟ representation of the army 
and the generals contributes to the large themes of his work, notably the development of imperial 
power. Ancient historiography has always placed warfare and military affairs at the centre of its 
„self-definition‟, but in modern historiography the political view has been examined to the detriment 
of the military view which has been largely untouched.
17
 Therefore this aspect of the army in the 
Annals has not been given the attention it deserves. However an examination of the interplay 
between the army with the state is important for the view that it gives of Tacitus‟ impressions of the 
Julio-Claudian emperors whom he saw as representatives of an increasingly autocratic regime. 
Tacitus‟ writings on the army in this respect show how he believes the emperors used and abused 
their power in order to dominate the state.  
In Tacitus‟ Annals, notwithstanding his gloomy introduction, a great deal of his writing is centred 
on warfare, despite the fact that as shown above, he considered the peace „only modestly 
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challenged‟ (modica lacessita pax).18 Overall, Tacitus manipulates the actions of the emperors‟ 
generals to underline what he saw as the rise of imperial power. Through his careful depiction of the 
wars that he relates Tacitus traces for us the evolution of this new institution. Tacitus manipulates 
the army in several ways. Germanicus in his wars in Germany is a foil for Tiberius, while Corbulo 
in his campaigns in Armenia is a foil for the debauchery that Tacitus saw in Nero‟s Rome. Tacitus 
utilises the armies of the east to show his opinion of the luxuria that he believed the east 
represented, a luxuria that threatened Rome itself.
19
  This is literary artifice since Tacitus was 
confined by the limits that he had set for himself to write of the early years of the principate, a 
period when Roman affairs were relatively stable.
20
 I will demonstrate that the army plays a major 
role in Tacitus‟ Annals, as it is employed by him to emphasise the situation in Rome, and the 
development of the new political system. I will achieve this by a critical reading of the Annals, 
analysing the language and interpretative choices made by Tacitus in his work in order to elucidate 
his views on the principate. 
TACITUS AS A HISTORIAN 
Scholars‟ views on Tacitus range from the belief that he was truthful and reliable, to views that his 
was mostly a work of literature and of less value for historical fact. There is a core of scholars who 
attest to Tacitus‟ fundamental integrity as an historian, for example Martin, Miller, Mendell and 
Syme.
21
  Martin writes:  
His essential honesty as an historian is nowhere more evident than in his handling of Tiberius‟ 
speeches. Though he was free, according to the canons of ancient historiography, to put his 
own words into the emperor‟s mouth, what he offers is not an expression of studied 
insincerity, but an effective measure of blunt common sense and shrewd political 
judgement.
22
 
 In the preface to his classic work Tacitus, Syme writes that Tacitus has always had his admirers as 
a composer of history, though, Syme reflects, in more recent times his value as an historian has 
been called into question.
23
 The views of these scholars are vindicated to some extent since Tacitus‟ 
veracity is indicated in some measure where evidence exists elsewhere. The Lyons Tablet of 
Claudius‟ reign on the entrance of Gauls into the senate was known to Tacitus, though his account 
of Claudius‟ speech in the Annals differs considerably from that given on the tablet, mostly in 
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regard to some of its salient facts.
24
 With regard to the trial of Cornelius Piso, though Tacitus uses 
what Talbert refers to as „historians‟ license‟ and dramatically shortens the time that the trial would 
have taken, many of the key details do appear in the document Senatus Consultum de Cn Pisone 
Patre.
25
 In fact Eck argues that Tacitus‟ account is more accurate than the Senatus Consultum itself 
since Tacitus had access to the senate‟s archives and the full record of the debate.26 Two edicts from 
Egypt testify to Germanicus‟ popularity there just as portrayed by Tacitus in his Annals. Finally the 
discovery of the mass graves from Kalkriese, the site of Varus‟ defeat, which archaeology proves 
were dug many years after the battle testify to the fact that these may have been the graves dug by 
Germanicus as stated in the Annals.
27
 Tacitus therefore wrote his Annals with reference to a core of 
historical facts that he had at his disposal. 
At the far end of the spectrum, there are scholars who believe that Tacitus is fundamentally 
unreliable. Woodman claims that Tacitus should be viewed purely from a literary viewpoint such as 
one would view the poets.
28
 He maintains that Tacitus‟ works cannot simply be used as historical 
evidence by modern historians. When this view is taken there is „precious little evidence left‟.29  
Haynes adds that:  
the inescapable and regrettable fact about ancient historians is that they “made things up” 
[sic]. The emerging discipline of historiography has emphasised the rhetorical richness of 
ancient history-writing and urged us to view the make-believe in its own right.
30
  
Mellor likewise challenges Tacitus‟ credibility as an historian, writing that his work has more in 
common with such excellent historical novelists as Tolstoy and George Eliot.
31
 Kajanto makes the 
claim that Tacitus did not write objective history, but that his work was „largely characterised by 
literary and rhetorical invention.‟32 These are the extreme views of Tacitus that do not take into 
account the fact that in a number of instances he can be proven to have a certain degree of accuracy 
as noted above.  
The majority of historians steer a middle course between the two extremes. Tacitus like all ancient 
historians had to work within the confines of his facts. But he encouraged his readers down certain 
lines of interpretation through his style and use of language. As Goodyear points out: 
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 Tacitus by the choice of words or phrase, by the inclusion or exclusion of details and by 
innuendo or indirect comment superimposes his interpretation on the facts without directly 
perverting them.
33
 
 This is true since Tacitus often uses rumour, innuendo and the direct speech of persons in the 
Annals to express his own opinion of the principate.
34
 An example of this is the death of Subrius 
Flavus, the Praetorian tribune, whose last words Tacitus uses to give his own opinion of the 
emperor Nero.
35
 
 As part of the „continuing critical analysis‟ of Roman historiography, scholars have paid great 
attention to the literary style and agendas of the ancient historians.
36
 Kraus and Woodman note that 
the form and language of the historian is as important as the text and indeed elucidates the text.
37
 As 
Woodman has shown, it is necessary to examine the style language and themes of Tacitus to enable 
his views and literary merit to be more clearly understood. This is because Tacitus often resorts to 
obfuscation in order to lead his reader to a viewpoint that he wishes them to reach. His treatment of 
the Praetorian Prefect Afranius Burrus is a good example of this. He is a man who obviously had 
Tacitus‟ approval, since he was connected with Tacitus‟ admired Seneca, but in order to cleanse his 
image Tacitus often glosses over his less admirable traits.
38
  
A careful study of Tacitus‟ style and language and his manipulation of the narrative form and 
content reveal the larger themes of the work. In this regard, O‟Gorman in particular writes: 
„Tacitus‟ writing resides in the continual interplay of these sometimes incompatible features, false 
appearance and hidden truth.‟39 She goes on to say: „this invites the reader to scrutinise the text and 
decode its hidden meanings‟.40 O‟Gorman‟s view is one of particular interest in that it shows how a 
close reading of Tacitus‟ text is necessary to understand the development of its themes. A good 
example of false appearance and hidden truth is Tacitus‟ dating of Corbulo‟s war in the east. 
Tacitus manipulates the chronology of military affairs in order to shape the image of the emperor. 
The year 60 opens with Nero participating in the quinquennial games, the beginning of what Tacitus 
saw as Nero‟s slide into debauchery.41 In the same year, Tacitus lists Corbulo‟s victory over 
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Artaxata and his intention of taking Tigranocerta, both of which actually took place in 58-59.
42
 
Tacitus‟ reason for placing Corbulo‟s achievements in 60 is that it illustrates the difference he 
wishes to make between the licentious emperor in Rome and the industrious general in the east. 
Further, Nero had murdered his mother in 59 and by placing Corbulo‟s actions a year later, he is 
making certain that the death of Agrippina is the main highlight of the year 59, and that the drama 
of that event is not interrupted by res externae. It is through this manipulation of historical fact that 
Tacitus shapes his portrayal of the emperor Nero. This example shows the importance of reading 
the text critically, being alert not just to the facts themselves, but how they are presented. 
Modern historians, then, view Tacitus from different viewpoints. Woodman and Haynes are useful 
in that they demonstrate that Tacitus, like all ancient historians, should be read with a certain degree 
of caution as to his presentation of the facts. This does not mean however that he is to be discredited 
altogether. The other extreme, that Tacitus is completely reliable is also to be treated with caution, 
as I have demonstrated above.  The middle course, that is the view of Goodyear, is the most 
valuable in that it allows us to appreciate the literary devices that he uses to shape his narrative 
without disregarding the factual information contained therein. 
ARMIES AND GENERALS 
Methodology 
This thesis will analyse the representation of the armies and generals in Tacitus‟ Annals by 
exploring the way Tacitus exploits them in order to present his opinions of events in Rome. This 
will be done by a careful analysis of his narrative, language and style, which he uses to good effect 
in his treatment of, for example, such persons as Germanicus and Corbulo. He manipulates his 
narrative of these men in order to contrast with the situation in Rome. Tacitus‟ manipulation of his 
form and content will be examined. These can be clearly shown in his treatment of the war against 
Tacfarinas in which Tacitus departs from his annalistic form. The examination of these aspects 
shows that Tacitus‟ representation of the army and generals contribute to the larger theme of the 
work, notably the imperial house. This is nowhere more obvious than in the relationship that 
Tacitus portrays between Tiberius and Germanicus. 
 A study of the Roman Army in Tacitus is of considerable importance, since, as mentioned above, it 
was the first time in Roman history that the entire army was under the control of one man, the 
princeps. Tacitus‟ portrayal of the army must therefore be placed in this context.43 As already noted, 
Tacitus uses various devices to portray the army and its generals, that of confusing dates, of 
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obscuring the facts and of representing their deeds in such a fashion that they reflected on the 
emperors they served. Therefore a historiographical analysis, focusing on the historian‟s language, 
style and narrative technique is important to highlight these points and to bring to light the facts 
behind Tacitus‟ literary dynamic. 
 Of course a great deal has been written on the Roman army. A number of writers have examined 
the army from a purely historical and social viewpoint, and they are important in that they provide 
the social, economic and service backgrounds of the Roman army, information that is essential in 
any detailed study of the Roman Army.
44
 Campbell‟s The Emperor and the Roman Army however 
gives a detailed study of the relations between the army, the generals and the emperors from 31BC 
– AD235.45 As this work explains, the Roman army was of crucial importance to the stability of the 
new principate and the relationship between the army and the emperor was the cornerstone of the 
new order. Augustus and the subsequent emperors referred to the legionaries as „fellow soldiers‟ 
and retained their loyalty by donatives at times of celebration and at an emperor‟s accession.46 Dio 
records that Tiberius won over the loyalty of the soldiers by using an oath established by 
Augustus.
47
 This means that the approval of the soldiers were necessary to the man who would be 
emperor. This, therefore, was the end of the Republican method of control of the armies.  
The Army in the eastern provinces is covered by a number of works.
48
 Benjamin Isaac‟s Limits of 
Empire: the Roman Army in the East is particularly significant in that it not only examines the 
armies in the east, but also its relations within the eastern provinces from the coast of the Black Sea 
to Egypt.
 49
 This is important since much of Tacitus‟ account of Nero‟s reign are centred on the 
army in the east, and it will be shown in this thesis that Tacitus used these armies in order to 
demonstrate his own perceptions of the emperor Nero. Another effective work is The Roman Army 
in the East, which reviews various aspects of the Roman army in the east from the geographical 
locations to the state of the eastern legions themselves.
50
 The western provinces have various works 
which touch on Germanicus‟ campaigns in Germany, the revolt of Tacfarinas in North Africa and 
the revolt of Boudica which are significant to my thesis.
51
  Of great importance to my project is the 
valuable work of Kajanto, Tacitus’ Attitude to War and the Roman Soldier, in which he examines 
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Tacitus‟ view of the Roman soldier and the army within a historiographical framework, similar to 
that which I shall employ in this thesis.
52
 Ash‟s Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitus’ 
Histories is valuable in that Ash examines the armies in Tacitus‟ Histories in the same manner that I 
intend to use in Tacitus‟ Annals.53 Finally, O‟Gorman highlights the fact that the military aspect of 
the ancient historians has been neglected in modern historiographical study showing that such an 
evaluation of the army in the Annals is overdue.
54
  
Tacitus himself had some military experience, and in the Agricola he shows that he is very familiar 
with the ways of the army and the career of his father-in-law.
55
 Tacitus himself was in favour of war 
and was opposed to Tiberius‟ anti-imperialist policy, that is, his keeping the empire within the 
limits set by Augustus.
56
  Tacitus claims that he does not have the glorious battles of the Republic to 
write about but maintains that he is forced to be content with rebellions and uprisings. In the 
Annals, Tacitus spends a good deal of books one and two writing about the rebellions in Pannonia 
and Germany, a situation that had implications for the ruling family itself. Some of Tacitus‟ most 
descriptive writing is centred on the account of the army‟s hardships during the campaign in 
Germany.
57
 Indeed, Tacitus valued the descriptions of these campaigns in that they gave him a 
chance to show off his florid rhetorical style. The campaign in Germany has as its hero the general 
Germanicus, the stepson of Tiberius, and it is obvious that Germanicus has fired Tacitus‟ 
imagination.  He is seen as the antithesis of Tiberius. This war and the war fought by Corbulo 
against the Parthians during the reign of Nero are the wars that Tacitus relates in the most detail in 
the text as it survives today. The original would undoubtedly have included the invasion8 and 
conquest of Britain under Claudius. As Germanicus can be seen as a contrast to Tiberius, the 
dedication of the army and the general Corbulo in the east can be seen as a foil for the decadence 
that Tacitus perceived in Nero‟s Rome.  
While Tacitus can be regarded as accurate up to a point, it is clear from the diverse interpretations 
of modern scholars that a reading of Tacitus‟ Annals at this time does require an appreciation of the 
language that Tacitus uses. However the outcome may not necessarily be as extreme a view as those 
of Woodman, Mellor, Kajanto and Haynes. Some of the accuracies that are evident in Tacitus I 
have cited already, and there is no reason to believe that he is totally unreliable or that he 
deliberately made things up. Nor can it be said that he is consistent in his dependability either. For 
instance, in a number of cases, Tacitus changes the chronology of battles to suit his own literary 
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agenda. For example, his placement of the wars against Tacfarinas is a noticeable attempt to 
intersperse res internae that he expressed as sorrowful with exciting res externae, even though his 
dating is affected in the process.
58
 This war lasted seven years, though Tacitus treats it as a series of 
almost isolated events as he is more interested in describing the ongoing saga of Germanicus. 
Germanicus was on his way to his death in the east with the trial of Cornelius Piso as a result, which 
is the focus of Tacitus‟ attention in this portion of the Annals. In his account of this war, Tacitus 
also strays from his own annalistic format, in that the war is placed in years unrelated to the actual 
events.  Therefore a cursory reading of Tacitus can be misleading if the reader is not alert and such 
devices go undetected, thus leading to a false conclusion. It is necessary to approach Tacitus from a 
historiographical viewpoint in order to reveal his „hidden meanings‟ in order to gain a full 
understanding of the text.
59
  It is this middle ground, that is, the ground between the claims that 
Tacitus should be viewed solely as a work of literature and the belief that he was totally to be relied 
upon, that must be tested when assessing Tacitus‟ treatment of the Roman army and the generals in 
the Annals. 
Further it has been stated that Tacitus‟ work was largely characterised by „literary and rhetorical 
elaboration‟.60 Most ancient historians give great prominence to speeches in their works.61 Tacitus 
is no different since, as a member of the educated upper class from which historians came he had 
studied rhetoric.
62
 Tacitus uses speeches widely in the Annals to highlight the affairs of the 
emperors or, as is relevant to this thesis, to give importance to a general that Tacitus was attempting 
to glorify. The speech before battle, for example, is a convention of historical works, and serves a 
number of purposes. It enables the reader to understand the problems from both sides of the battle 
and the strategies that will be used. The speeches can also be paired to give the views of the 
opposing generals. As Marincola says: 
For the Romans the speeches attributed to enemies provided an opportunity to present the 
viewpoint of Rome‟s opponents and thereby engage in a form of critical political analysis 
relevant to both the particular situation and the more general issues.
63
 
 The paired speeches before the battles against Florus and Sacrovir, for example are a good  
example of this as Tacitus uses his rhetorical skill to bring to life the realities of the battles. The 
speech of the Gauls is given in the third person, while the speech of the Roman commander is given 
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in the first person, creating a sense that the Romans are the ones in command of the situation. The 
Gauls are credited with saying: 
The soldiery they said was disaffected on hearing of the extermination of Germanicus; it was 
an exceptional time to regain their freedom, if, while flourishing themselves, they only 
reflected how barren Italy was, how unwarlike the urban plebs.
64
 
The general Silius replies: 
Recently the Turonus was crushed by a single cohort, the Treverus by a single wing, the 
Sequani by a few squadrons of this very army! To the extent that the Aedui are rich in money 
and enjoy a wealth of pleasures, convince them how much unwarlike they are – and spare a 
thought for the runaways!
 65 
Tacitus is presenting us with the opinions of the opponents here in such a way as to give his views 
of both the Gauls and of the stagnation of manpower in Italy itself. He is also making a political 
statement on the state of the res publica and the army itself, shocked and unsettled by the death of 
Germanicus. 
In this thesis I will concentrate on the army, the senatorial generals and the emperors in Tacitus‟ 
Annals in order to show how Tacitus manipulates them to articulate his views on the principate. A 
historiographical study of his portrayal of the army in the Annals exposes the many problems that 
Tacitus perceived in the principate itself. Tacitus wrote in the beginning of the Histories that he 
embarked on a story full of incident, marked by bitter fighting and sinister peace.
66
 This is in stark 
contrast to his view noted above of the wars that he proposed to recall in the Annals. It is true that in 
the Histories Tacitus had a great and bloody civil war on his hands to describe. Tacitus takes up 
about one third of his original work with the events of 68/69.
67
 The methodology of Ash in writing 
of the Histories from a historiographical point of view is relevant also to the Annals. Ash in her 
work Ordering Anarchy: Armies and Leaders in Tacitus’ Histories argues that facts have become 
less of a focus for attention than the historian‟s method of presenting those facts.68 Ash examines 
Tacitus‟ choice of language, his stylistic flourishes, and his narrative structure in order to 
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understand the depiction of the wars in the Histories.
69
 Ash shows that the imperial armies differed 
from those of the civil war at the end of the Republic in the sense that the Republican armies relied 
on their generals for their pay and developed close relations with their generals such as Caesar and 
Pompey and later Antony and Octavian.
70
 The imperial armies relied upon the emperors and 
expected donatives at the accession of each emperor. This was the cause of the mutinies at the 
beginning of Tiberius‟ reign and the underestimation of the importance of the donative was the 
cause Galba‟s downfall.71 Further, as Ash notes, Tacitus had four different factions of the army to 
deal with in his description of the civil war of 68/69, the Galbians, the Othonians, the Vitellians and 
the Flavians.
72
 In the Annals, the armies are even more compartmentalised than they are in the 
Histories. They are individual units stationed across the empire. This means a slightly different 
approach to the Annals is necessary, in that the wars in the Annals are interspersed with res internae 
unlike the account of the civil war in the Histories. However, historiographical means similar to 
those used by Ash in her work are necessary to elucidate Tacitus‟ literary techniques as regards the 
armies in the Annals. However this thesis will adopt Ash‟s methodology by studying the literary 
techniques of Tacitus in order to gain a greater appreciation of the overall themes and arguments of 
the Annals. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS. 
My first chapter will deal with the emperor and the senatorial generals. It is my intention to 
illustrate that Tacitus employs the career of Germanicus to explore the tensions that were rife in the 
imperial house in the early years of the principate. This agenda emerges also in Tacitus‟ analysis of 
the actions of C. Silius in the war against Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul and his subsequent trial four 
years after the death of Germanicus. Tacitus sees C. Silius as a friend of Agrippina and therefore an 
enemy of Tiberius, who had by this time fallen under the influence of Sejanus. Several other 
generals will be discussed including Furius Camillus, L. Apronius, Junius Blaesus, the uncle of 
Sejanus and Cornelius Dolabella who were all combatants in the war against Tacfarinas. All of 
these generals, except for the last, received triumphal insignia and Blaesus was hailed imperator, 
the last time this was allowed outside the imperial family. Finally an analysis of Tacitus‟ depiction 
of the general Corbulo in the Annals emphasises the depravity that Tacitus saw in the reign of Nero 
as he compares the excellence of the general with the debauched princeps. 
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The second chapter of my thesis will examine the legions in the western provinces. This analysis 
will show that Tacitus uses the actions of the army throughout the Annals to highlight the difference 
that he perceived between the glorious res externae, the wars taking place in the provinces and the 
problems that he saw in political affairs at Rome. The chronology of the wars against Florus and 
Sacrovir in Gaul and the war against Tacfarinas are manipulated by Tacitus so that they tie in 
thematically with events taking place in Rome.  Finally Tacitus relates the war against Boudica so 
that it shows the determination of the Britons to gain their freedom as opposed to the servility that 
Tacitus saw in the Roman senate and the debauchery that Tacitus saw in Nero himself. 
Chapter three will focus on the legions in the eastern provinces since warfare in the east takes up a 
great deal of space in the Annals. Tacitus devotes significant space to Parthian affairs as they 
provide a foil for affairs in Rome. The commencement of active warfare against the Parthians in 54 
by the general Corbulo forms the beginning of a series of comparisons between the excellence of 
the general and the decadence in Nero‟s court. In addition, it is interesting that in the beginning of 
the war, Tacitus portrays the eastern legions as being lax through a long period of peace and 
exposure to the luxuria of the east. I will show that this view of luxuria represents the common 
Roman view of the eastern proinces. This is a historical topos found in the works of many ancient 
writers, and Tacitus uses it even to the extent that he accuses the eastern army of being possessed by 
luxuria.
73
 Further, after the laxity that Tacitus has described has been overcome, I will demonstrate 
how Tacitus uses these newly disciplined legions once again to highlight the difference between res 
internae and res externae developing the themes of chapter two. This will have the added effect of 
elucidating how Tacitus saw the actions by the army in the east as competent and efficient 
compared with the disorder that he saw in Rome.  
The final chapter will address the complex matter of the Praetorian Guard. A reading of the Annals 
shows that Tacitus regarded the Praetorian cohorts and their Prefects as the emperor‟s means of 
domination over the senate and the people. The rise of Sejanus under Tiberius is particularly 
significant: Sejanus is depicted as an oppressor and an evil influence on Tiberius.  Likewise I will 
show that the elevation to the Praetorian Prefecture of Tigellinus under Nero can be seen as an 
attempt on Tacitus‟ part to portray him in the same manner as Sejanus. The account of the Prefect 
Afranius Burrus under Claudius and Nero is altogether different in that Tacitus shows a politically 
active Praetorian Prefect in a positive manner as opposed to the way in which he depicts Sejanus 
and Tigellinus. The Praetorian Guards themselves are painted as the emperor‟s means of 
subjugation and oppression of the senate and the people. It is my intention to establish that Tacitus 
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uses the Praetorian Guard to illustrate the oppression that he believes that the principate 
represented.  
Through a historiographical approach to the Annals, I intend to illustrate Tacitus‟ use of the Roman 
army and its generals to emphasise the problems that Tacitus perceived in the early principate. This 
is to draw attention to the important role played by the army and its generals in the new institution. 
It will also point to the fact that that Tacitus makes full use of literary devices and topoi in his 
portrayal of the army in order to contribute to his theme. This will be achieved through the 
interaction of the army, its generals and the princeps and the ruling family. By analysing the 
language,, style and structure of the Annals, I intend to illustrate how Tacitus used the Roman army 
and its generals to emphasise the problems that he perceived in the early principate. The interaction 
of the army, its generals, the princeps and the ruling family within the Annals demonstrate the 
tensions between the constituent elements of the Roman state and the individuals who wielded 
power. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE EMPERORS AND THE SENATORIAL GENERALS 
As quoted in the introduction, Tacitus claims that earlier writers had battles, victories and civil 
disturbances to write about, but that he saw his Annals as confined and inglorious.
74
 In contrast to 
res internae, which he describes as sorrowful, for the portions of the work dealing with the res 
externae Tacitus has to rely on a series of minor wars and rebellions, whose generals often reflect 
negatively on the character of the emperors and the politics in Rome.
75
 Indeed, as Ginsberg writes, 
these res externae were exploited by Tacitus to elaborate or complement events at Rome, thus 
providing a thematic unity to the Annals as a whole.
76
 This chapter will investigate the way in 
which Tacitus uses Germanicus‟ command in Germany as a way of illustrating the friction within 
the imperial family. It will also examine Tacitus‟ portrayal of the senatorial commanders who 
conducted the war against the rebellion of Tacfarinas in Africa, and the war of Silius against Florus 
and Sacrovir in Gaul as they reflect on imperial politics in Rome. Finally the command of Corbulo 
in the east will be examined showing how Tacitus portrays him in opposition to Nero. This study 
will highlight how Tacitus‟ representation of the senatorial generals is designed to illustrate the 
character of the emperors and Roman politics. 
GERMANICUS 
Tacitus‟ theme in the sections on Germanicus is one of tension between Germanicus and Tiberius, 
and within the imperial family generally in these early years of the principate. There have been 
many different scholarly interpretations of the characters of Germanicus and Tiberius in the 
Annals.
77
 According to Goodyear, Tacitus uses Germanicus as a possible rival for Tiberius.
78
 
Pelling also argues that Germanicus, rather than operating as a foil for Tiberius as an individual, 
serves as an alternative that helps to highlight what is distinctive about the principate.
79
 However 
Martin, in opposition to Pelling, does dismiss Germanicus as being merely a foil for Tiberius and 
says also that Tacitus only uses Germanicus to underline his relationship with his uncle and 
stepfather.
80
 Martin‟s first point is too shallow, and Goodyear‟s and Pelling‟s arguments are the 
more compelling. Martin‟s second view has some value but needs a further examination in regards 
to why Tacitus chose to highlight that relationship.  The fact is, though, that Tiberius and 
                                               
74
 Tac. Ann. 4.32. 
75
 Tac. Ann. 4.32. 
76
 Ginsburg 1981: 98. 
77
 Kelly 2010; Ross 1973; Williams 1997; Rutland 1987; Bird 1973; Pelling 1993; Schotter1968; Levick 1999; Levene 
2009a. 
78
 Goodyear 1972: 140-141. 
79
 Pelling 1993:67. 
80
 Martin 1981: 107.  
15 
 
Germanicus‟ relationship with the troops enables Tacitus to explore the rivalries within the imperial 
house.  
 
The accession of Tiberius was a landmark event in the embryonic principate. It has been argued that 
the change of rule from Augustus to Tiberius was a period of transition to the more autocratic rule 
of later emperors such as Caligula, Nero and Domitian, and this may be the reason for the dark view 
that Tacitus held of Tiberius.
81
 Certainly Tiberius was the first man to inherit the role of princeps 
and the years following his accession contain critical moments in Rome‟s transformation to a 
monarchy.
82
  Tacitus, however, hints in his writing that it was improper for Tiberius to give orders 
to the Praetorian Guard so soon after Augustus‟ death, implying that the transition to the principate 
was not easy. Tacitus writes that at the death of Augustus, the memory of Drusus led people to 
believe that he would have given them back their freedom had he lived, hence their goodwill 
towards his son Germanicus.
83
 It is no surprise then that Tacitus should give a negative opinion of 
Tiberius. 
 The army had played a vital role in the events that brought about rule by one man, and the loss of 
the Republican system that allowed armies to be controlled by senatorial and praetorian generals. 
Of course under the principate the legions were still under the command of such men, but owed 
their ultimate allegiance to the princeps instead of the senate and the people.
84
 This had been the 
case since Augustus was given the maius imperium in 23BC.
85
 Augustus had been the linchpin 
between the civil wars that had devastated the Roman world and a lasting peace, and it was in fact 
the control of the armies by this one man after 23BC that had played the major part in establishing 
the principate.
86
 However Tacitus highlights the fact that, at Tiberius‟ accession, Germanicus was 
gaining a degree of allegiance with the armies that reflected the Republican mode, where the 
custom was for a proconsul to be in charge of large armies. This was a threat that must have worried 
the new princeps. Germanicus was extremely popular and if he had aimed at the principate with the 
seven legions that he controlled on the Rhine, civil war may have reared its head again at this 
tenuous time.
87
 Tacitus‟ record of the relations between Tiberius, his general Germanicus and the 
armies that he controlled is crucial to the understanding of the uncertainties of that period. 
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Tacitus relates Tiberius‟ apparent reluctance to take up the position of princeps with equally 
apparent disbelief.
88
 Tacitus states that Tiberius‟ words were always weighted and dark, when he 
was trying to hide his real feelings, implying that Tiberius‟ reluctance to take up the office of 
princeps was feigned.
89
 In addition, Tacitus says that Tiberius‟ alarm about Germanicus was one of 
the main reasons why Tiberius was apparently hesitant about taking up the role of princeps.
90
 Of 
course Germanicus controlled all the legions and allied auxiliaries of Germany, the reserves of the 
provinces in the west, and held remarkable goodwill with the army and among the people.
91
 This 
placed Germanicus in a very strong position politically.  
Setting the scene for his theme of discord between Tiberius and Germanicus in the Annals, Tacitus 
tells us that Germanicus was the son of Drusus, the grandson of Livia Augusta and that he had a 
remarkable friendliness (comitas), quite different from Tiberius dark arrogance.
92
 It is important to 
an understanding of the uncertainties facing the new princeps to note that Tacitus several times 
indicates that Tiberius was hesitant to depart from the rules set down by Augustus.
93
 Significantly, 
at Ann. 1.11.4 Tiberius continued to hold the empire within the limits that Augustus had set. Tacitus 
shows that it was Germanicus‟ aggressive actions across the Rhine in contravention of the set limits 
of the empire, coupled with Germanicus‟ popularity with the legions that caused the dissent that he 
shows existed between Tiberius and his heir. According to Tacitus, Tiberius reacted as follows:  
The principal reason [for Tiberius’ initial hesitation to take upon himself the role of princeps] 
was alarm lest Germanicus backed by so many, the vast reserves of the provinces, and a 
wonderful popularity, should prefer to hold rather than wait for command.
94
 
 Indeed this friction is vividly portrayed when Germanicus raised a pile of enemy weapons: 
„Concerning himself he added nothing either through fear of jealousy [from Tiberius] or holding the 
view that his exploits were enough.‟95 Tacitus is using the actions of both Germanicus and Tiberius 
to show the tensions that strained the ruling house at the accession of Tiberius. 
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Yet one of Tiberius‟ first acts upon taking hold of the reigns of state was to request proconsular 
imperium for Germanicus.
96
 This may have been merely a renewal of the imperium that Germanicus 
had held under Augustus and was necessary for Germanicus continued work in the west.
97
 
Therefore Tacitus shows that though Tiberius might have felt uneasy about Germanicus, he 
nevertheless upheld his position in Germany for the time being, possibly as a means of stabilising 
the succession. For Germanicus‟ part, Tacitus has him twice assert his loyalty to Tiberius the 
second of these being the most dramatic.
98
 As Tacitus describes it, when the mutineers on the Rhine 
offered the principate to Germanicus, he tried to kill himself, saying that he would rather die than be 
a traitor to Tiberius. Tacitus portrays Germanicus as a loyal general who would not compromise his 
honour. Tiberius, on the other hand is portrayed by Tacitus with disapproval, since he is reluctant to 
go to settle the mutinies in person.
99
 In this respect, he accuses Tiberius of „false delay‟ (cunctatione 
ficta).
 100
 This is consistent with Tacitus‟ overall negative depiction of Tiberius as stationary and 
apathetic as opposed to the amiable and active Germanicus. 
Tacitus tells us that Tiberius voted a triumph for Germanicus in 15.
101
 Tacitus, who states that the 
war in Germany was still remaining, gives the clear implication that Tiberius had an underlying 
motive in awarding the triumph, that of separating Germanicus from his legions.
102
  Tacitus has so 
far portrayed the tension that lay between the two men, and he now depicts Tiberius as beginning to 
fear that Germanicus was becoming out of control since he delayed returning to Rome. Further, 
Germanicus had completed his mission, and repeated raids into Germany were achieving nothing.  
The situation deteriorated to the extent that Tiberius was reduced to ordering Germanicus home, 
firstly in a mildly worded reproof that acknowledged his successes, pointed out his losses and 
further made the point that he himself had won more success with the Germans by diplomacy. He 
then conferred a consulship upon Germanicus, and when that failed to bring him home, made an 
attack on his „modesty‟ (modestia).103 Tacitus‟ claims that Germanicus was aware that Tiberius‟ 
words of praise were „made up‟ (fingere) and that they were really motivated „through jealousy‟ 
(per invidiam) is another attempt to portray Tiberius in a malignant way.
104
 This shows how Tacitus 
uses the uneasy relationship between Tiberius and Germanicus for his own historiographical 
purposes to emphasise the unease within the early years of Tiberius‟ principate. Such a problematic 
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relationship between Tiberius and his heir in these early years must have boded ill for the future for 
the embryonic institution if Germanicus‟ popularity had continued to grow. The Senatus Consultum 
de Cn. Pisone Patre (SCPP) shows the fear of civil war that existed at this time and this is 
highlighted by Germanicus‟ heritage.105 This is highlighted by Germanicus‟ heritage: as the great-
nephew of Augustus and grandson of Marcus Antonius, „Germanicus was related on both sides to 
civil war.‟106 The civil war was not so long in the past that this would not have occurred to Tiberius. 
Tacitus shows in the reactions of the German legions at the accession of Tiberius that a return to 
civil war was in fact expected by the troops.
107
 
Tacitus uses the figure of Germanicus‟ wife Agrippina for the same literary purposes as 
Germanicus. Agrippina was the granddaughter of Augustus, who Tacitus describes as a woman of 
remarkable fecundity, chastity and a volatile temperament kept in check by her love for her 
husband.
108
 Moreover Tacitus tells us that she turned her untamed spirit to good effect. The threat 
posed by Agrippina‟ ancestry is highlighted by Tacitus when Germanicus asks her to leave the 
mutinous legions. As Germanicus‟ „contemptuous wife‟ (aspernantem uxorem) to use Tacitus‟ 
words, she claims that her descent from Augustus made her equal to facing the dangers of the 
mutiny.
109
 Further, Tacitus relates Tiberius‟ disquiet when Agrippina prevents the soldiers in 
Germany from tearing down a bridge, tends to the wounded and hands out clothing.
110
 Tacitus 
acclaims her as „a woman of mighty spirit‟ (femina ingens animi).111 Tacitus is actually portraying 
Agrippina in the role of a good general in her treatment of the soldiers. According to Tacitus it 
occurred to Tiberius at this time that Agrippina‟s actions were not straightforward: He makes it 
clear that Tiberius believed Agrippina had her own agenda.
112
 Tacitus relates that the memory of 
Agrippina‟s ancestry, her distinguished fertility and conspicuous modesty caused the shame in the 
troops that allowed Germanicus to end the Rhine mutiny.
113
 According to Tacitus, Agrippina had 
suppressed a mutiny that the princeps‟ name had been unable to stop and that this caused great 
uneasiness in Tiberius.
114
 Suspicion in Tiberius is quite understandable, since Germanicus was 
already extremely popular with the legions and now his wife was equally so. She was, as Tacitus 
says, „more influential with the armies than legates or generals‟, even holding her son up to be 
                                               
105
 SCPP ll 35, 45. 
106
 Kraus 2009: 111.  
107
 Tac. Ann. 16.1.1. 
108
 Tac. Ann. 1.33.3. 
109
 Tac. Ann. 1.40.4. 
110
 Tac. Ann. 1.69.1. 
111
 Tac. Ann. 1.69.1-3. 
112
 Tac. Ann. 1.69.3. 
113
 Tac. Ann. 1.41.2. 
114
 Tac. Ann. 1.69.4.  
19 
 
called Caesar Caligula.
115
 Tacitus is, in fact, presenting an alternative imperial family on the Rhine 
with the legions as their source of power and authority.  
Augustus, by marrying his granddaughter Agrippina to his great nephew Germanicus and forcing 
his adoption onto Tiberius had assured that his own line would succeed to the principate.
116
 As 
Tacitus shows us from the number of times that he cites her ancestry, Agrippina was aware of her 
heritage, aware that her husband and her progeny were destined for empire, and according to 
Tacitus, it seems to have occurred to Tiberius that it might happen sooner rather than later.
117
 In 
fact, in her ancestry, her influence with her husband, her numerous children and her popularity with 
the legions, Tacitus presents Agrippina as a highly dangerous woman. This is magnified by the fact 
that she is portrayed as the iconic woman, as Tacitus uses her ancestry and fecundity to depict 
Agrippina as the ideal of Roman womanhood.
118
 O‟Gorman highlights the pathetic similarity of 
Agrippina leaving the mutineers‟ camp with her son clasped at her bosom, to her later departure 
from Antioch with the ashes of her husband in the same manner.
119
 Certainly Tacitus plays on the 
pathos of Agrippina‟s plight in both instances, but to view Agrippina simply as Tacitus‟ means of 
creating pathetic images, and as an image of ideal womanhood, is to ignore the fact that Agrippina, 
with her lineage, her successes with the army and as the wife of the heir to the principate, was in 
herself very powerful. Tacitus, in fact, exploits her position as Germanicus‟ wife and her influence 
with the legions as a way of demonstrating the instability in the early years of the Tiberian 
principate. 
GERMANICUS IN THE EAST 
In 17, Tiberius moved to have Germanicus posted to the east in order to settle matters there.
120
 
Tacitus, aiming to show the emperor‟s mistrust for Germanicus, claims that Tiberius saw a posting 
to the east as a reason for dragging Germanicus away from his familiar legions and exposing him to 
new dangers and guile (dolo simul casibus).
121
 This, though, is still a doubtful claim on Tacitus‟ 
part, since Germanicus probably faced worse dangers in the German wars than he did in the east. In 
the eastern provinces his task was not warfare, but diplomacy, which he accomplished without risk. 
It should also be noted that Piso the governor of Syria during Germanicus‟ time there, was accused 
of interfering in these proceedings, and raising the fear of civil war (bellum civile) by the senate 
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after Germanicus‟ death.122  However, Tacitus is undoubtedly correct in his view that Tiberius 
wanted to get Germanicus away from the western legions with which he was entirely too popular 
for the princeps‟ comfort. He appointed Cn Piso to the governorship, a move obviously made to 
prevent Germanicus from having entire control over the legions of the east and so building up the 
popularity with them that he had enjoyed in Germany.
123
 As governor of Syria, Piso would have 
been in control of the legions.
124
 Tacitus claims that „certain people believed that secret instructions 
had been given to Piso by Tiberius‟.125 This is a literary device used to blacken Tiberius, but in fact 
there may have been some truth in the rumour. Piso outstripped Germanicus to Syria. There he 
courted by every means at his disposal the favour of the legions even to the extent of allowing them 
licence in the cities and thereby gaining the title of „The Legions‟ Parent‟ (parens legionum). This is 
a warning by Tacitus that Piso‟s priority was to prevent Germanicus from achieving any degree of 
popularity with the legions in the east.
126
 Tacitus therefore shows how the legions functioned as part 
of a power struggle between Germanicus and Tiberius. Further Tacitus portrays Cornelius Piso as 
Tiberius‟ agent in curbing Germanicus. This underlines the tension that existed between the 
emperor and his heir, with the legions at the centre of the discontent. 
Germanicus again showed his tendency to go beyond his authority in visiting Egypt without 
permission after he had settled the problems in the east, and opening its granaries to the people. The 
province of Egypt was settled by Augustus so that no senators or equites could go there except for 
those expressly given permission by the princeps. Egypt was Rome‟s bread basket, and interference 
in Egypt by a rival would be a danger to the princeps.
127
 By recording this visit in such a way that it 
showed Germanicus‟ popularity even in Egypt, Tacitus once more presents Germanicus as a 
potential rival to Tiberius. According to Tacitus, upon his return from Egypt to Syria, Germanicus 
found that Piso had reversed all his decisions regarding the legions and cities.
128
 Given Germanicus‟ 
reckless actions in Egypt, a province where he held no authority, there is, therefore, the possibility 
that perhaps Piso was correct to reverse them. Tacitus uses this state of affairs to highlight the 
hostility between the two representatives of Tiberius, and thus underlining the uneasiness within the 
imperial system when rivals challenged the emperor‟s military authority.  
The wives of both Germanicus and Piso play a significant role in Tacitus‟ narrative. Piso‟s wife 
Plancina accompanied him to the east, and was also active with the legions. Tacitus‟ favourable 
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opinion of Agrippina in Germany, however, is in exact contrast to his description of Piso‟s wife, 
Plancina, in the east:  
nor did Plancina keep herself within female proprieties but participated in cavalry exercises 
and the marches past of cohorts…some even of the good soldiers being ready for wicked 
compliance with her.
129
  
In his depiction of Piso‟s wife Plancina, Tacitus shows the tensions and manipulations that were 
going on within the imperial house. Tacitus states that Livia Augusta warned Plancina to assail 
Agrippina in womanly rivalry on her arrival in the east.
130
 In fact Livia Augusta‟s advice to 
Plancina was in response to Agrippina‟s actions in Germany, and was meant to inspire Plancina to 
emulate her with the eastern legions. It was a deliberate attempt on Livia‟s part to prevent the 
growth of Agrippina‟s influence with the legions of the east that she had achieved in the west, and 
not just womanly spite on Livia‟s part. Certainly, a woman gaining any sort of control over the 
army was outside the perceived role of Roman womanhood.
131
 In fact, a debate took place in the 
senate in 21 on the subject of whether or not men should be permitted to take their wives with them 
to the provinces, during which it was stated that women: „strode among the soldiers and had 
centurions to hand; only recently a woman had presided at the exercise of cohorts and march past of 
legions.‟132  The similarity of Tacitus‟ wording regarding Plancina‟s actions with the army in 17 and 
the words spoken in the senate in 21 indicate that it was Plancina who provoked the senatorial 
debate.
133
 Therefore, Tacitus, because of his obvious admiration for Germanicus and Agrippina, 
presents Agrippina as virtuous and courageous when she interferes with the Rhine legions and 
Plancina as interfering and unwomanly when she does the same with the eastern legions. 
Tacitus portrays Germanicus in the Annals as a man of immense affability and great popularity with 
the people. However Tacitus shows that it is in his popularity with the legions that Germanicus 
appears as a rival to Tiberius.  It is obvious from a reading of Tacitus that Tiberius was at first very 
uneasy in his role at the head of the new principate. Germanicus‟ actions caused great disquiet in 
within the ruling house: he continually forayed into Germany despite Tiberius‟ requests for him to 
return to Rome, he earned immense popularity with the armies of the west, he made an unauthorised 
entry into Egypt and his wife Agrippina obviously interfered with the troops. Tiberius‟ actions in 
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sending Germanicus to the east away from his familiar legions, confirms just how seriously 
Tiberius took this threat. Tacitus therefore, in his account of the relationship between Germanicus 
and Tiberius, uses the army and Germanicus‟ military authority to depict the unease that was rife in 
the reigning house during this embryonic stage of the principate. 
THE GENERAL IN THE REVOLTS OF FLORUS AND SACROVIR 
In this section I will explore the way in which Tacitus portrays other senatorial generals involved in 
the suppression of the revolts of Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul and Tacfarinas in North Africa. In 21 
uprisings of Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul broke out and were suppressed by C. Silius, who had been 
a friend of Germanicus and had triumphed under him in Germany.
134
 Tacitus‟ account of Silius‟ life 
and career are significant because they illustrate the attitude of the senate towards Tiberius.The 
revolts themselves will be covered in more detail in Chapter Two. Silius defeated the Gallic tribes 
firstly under Florus and then under Sacrovir at Augustodorum, though it did not, according to 
Tacitus, earn him the gratitude of Tiberius. Germanicus‟ friendship was dangerous even after 
Germanicus‟ death, and this bond between the two men led to Silius downfall at the hands of 
Tiberius, since he was perceived to be a threat. 
 At Rome just after the defeat of the revolts, Tacitus portrays Sejanus as pressing Tiberius hard. 
Sejanus claimed that that the state was divided as if by civil war (ut civili bello) between followers 
of Tiberius and those of Agrippina calling themselves Agrippina‟s faction (partium Agrippinae 
vocent).
135
 Tacitus is here setting Agrippina up to be a victim, as one of her followers falls to 
Sejanus. Sejanus proposed to put an end to the factionalism that he perceived by prosecuting two of 
Agrippina‟s leading followers as a warning to the rest. C. Silius, a general under Germanicus and 
whose wife Sosia Galla was a close friend of Agrippina, was one of those chosen. According to 
Tacitus, the fact that they were friends of Germanicus was the ruin, (perniciosa) of both the men.
136
 
Silius‟ fall was desired all the more because he had triumphed in Germany and had controlled a 
great army for seven years. His downfall would therefore cause more alarm than that of anyone 
else.
137
 This connection with Germanicus four years after his death highlights the importance that 
Tacitus places on the unease that existed between Tiberius and Germanicus during his lifetime. It 
also implies that Tiberius still considered Germanicus to be a threat, through his friends and his 
widow, Agrippina, even after his death. The cold blooded destruction of two men, one of them C. 
Silius graphically shows Tacitus‟ belief in the power that Sejanus held over the princeps. 
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However, Tacitus himself says that Silius was his own worst enemy, boasting uncontrollably that it 
had been his soldiery who had remained loyal when the others mutinied and that Tiberius would not 
have survived had conditions been otherwise.
138
 This was a challenge to the emperor himself. 
Tacitus writes that Tiberius‟ previous gratitude had turned to hatred (odium). Tacitus further reports 
that Tiberius saw Silius‟ boasting as destructive to his position.139 At his trial, Silius was accused 
variously of conspiring with Sacrovir in his own war and extortion. Tiberius is reported as saying, 
when Silius asked for a stay of the trial, that „one should not infringe upon the prerogative of a 
consul on whose vigilance he relied to see that the state came to no harm.‟140 It was typical of 
Tiberius, wrote Tacitus, to cloak with old-time words crimes only newly devised.
141
 It is generally 
agreed that Tacitus used the Acta Senatus.
142
 These words of Tiberius may have been recorded there 
and may have been reported by Tacitus in an attempt to show Tiberius as a hypocrite. This phrase, 
ne quod res publica detrimentum caperet, although used under the principate had limited meaning, 
since the safety of the state lay not with the consuls, as is portrayed here, but with the princeps. In 
addition, such words in a trial were more commensurate with a charge of maiestas. 
 It is significant that Silius‟ name is associated with that of Agrippina, for it was to Silius‟ own 
legions in Germany that she had fled for protection from the mutineers. These were the men with 
whom she eventually gained such popularity, and Tacitus suggests that this is why Silius was 
condemned Tacitus certainly makes note of Sejanus influence over the princeps, but it is the fear of 
Agrippina, and the legacy of Germanicus that comes through in the narrative of the destruction of 
this general. Tacitus presents us with the fact that the ghost of Germanicus, former commander of 
seven legions, still hung over Roman imperial affairs to the extent that former a former friend and 
legate was condemned. The emperor could not have any rivals whose military successes, influence 
with the soldiers, and an association with Agrippina, whom he did not trust, threaten his own 
position. 
During the chapters reporting the recall of Germanicus to Rome, his posting to the east and the 
aftermath of his death, Tacitus relates the rebellion of Tacfarinas in North Africa. Tacitus relates 
this as a series of res internae interspersed with the events of the war that will be examined in 
Chapter Two. At this point I will discuss the generals involved in the war: Furius Camillus, L. 
Apronius and Junius Blaesus. It will be shown that Tacitus‟ account of their careers exposes the 
sycophancy of the senate under Tiberius. After an account of Tacfarinas‟ gathering of his followers 
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and the actions of his co-rebel Mazippa, there follows a brief account of the war and the Roman 
victory under the proconsul Furius Camillus, in 17. Tacitus says of the victorious Furius Camillus 
that he was not regarded as a soldier, and therefore Tiberius was the readier to laud his exploits 
before the senate.
143
  Tacitus here shows the weakness of the senate for appointing a man who „was 
not regarded as a soldier.‟ The senate awarded him triumphal insignia144 „which Camillus because 
of his modest lifestyle enjoyed in safety.‟145 Tiberius‟ wholehearted approval of Camillus and his 
grant of the triumphal insignia to the general is a vivid contrast to the ambivalence with which 
Tacitus presents the triumph granted to Germanicus. Tacitus implies that Camillus was not seen as a 
threat to Tiberius, whereas Germanicus was. The word impune- meaning „safely‟ or „without peril‟ 
is a startling way to describe a general holding the triumphal insignia. Tacitus may be comparing 
the „safety‟ of Camillus with that of Germanicus, who celebrated his triumph in Rome the in the 
same year that Camillus was awarded his triumphal insignia, and was now, according to Tacitus, 
going into danger in the east.
146
  
Tacitus reports that the war recommenced in 20 although there is evidence that the war had been 
continuing since 17.
147
 L. Apronius, another former legate of Germanicus who had triumphed under 
him in Germany, succeeded Camillus as governor of North Africa and held the post from 18-20.
148
  
Tacitus does not state that triumphal insignia were awarded for Apronius at this point, but he does 
imply it at Ann 4.23.1:  
Whenever previous leaders believed that their achievements warranted a successful request 
for triumphal insignia, they had neglected consideration for the enemy; and now there were 
three laurel wreathed statues in the City.
149
 
The three statues can only apply to Camillus, Apronius and Blaesus, discussed below, as the last 
general of the war was denied the triumphal insignia.
150
 
For the next phase of the war, Tiberius suggested that the senate itself appoint a governor though 
the senate was unable to choose and put the responsibility back onto the princeps.
151
 Tacitus again 
shows the senate as being was weak since they thwarted Tiberius‟ attempt to share his power with 
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that body, a power that he had attempted to persuade them to share earlier in the Annals.
152
 Tacitus 
though, turns the senate‟s weakness to Tiberius‟ disadvantage. Tiberius, angry with the senate for 
putting the responsibility back onto him, suggested Manius Lepidus and Junius Blaesus. Lepidus 
refused, and so too did Blaesus, though Tacitus says that he eventually agreed after „unanimous 
flattery assisted him to change his mind‟.153 Tacitus states that Lepidus had refused because Blaesus 
was too powerful: 
and there was understood also something which he [Tiberius] kept quiet: Blaesus was 
Sejanus‟ uncle and for that reason highly effective in terms of power.154  
This is another instance where Tacitus implies that the senate under the empire is servile to 
Tiberius, since the senators themselves should have been the first to volunteer for service as 
generals in the senatorial province of North Africa. Tacitus is also blackening Tiberius for putting 
forward Sejanus‟ relative, though it has to be said that Blaesus did have the required experience, 
since he had been in charge of the Pannonian legions at the time of the mutiny that was put down by 
Drusus. In addition, Blaesus did show that he was a capable general in his conduct of the war 
against Tacfarinas. His governorship was therefore extended.
155
 Tacitus does not record the next 
chapter of the battle against Tacfarinas, except to say that Blaesus was awarded triumphal insignia, 
and that Tiberius said that it was to honour Sejanus.
156
 This is contradictory in that Tacitus also 
reports that Blaesus was worthy of the honour.
 157
 The ambiguity in the perception of this general, 
eminently capable, but depicted as a favourite of Tiberius, must be seen as an determination on 
Tacitus‟ part to show the growing power of Sejanus and his family. 
Tacfarinus then demanded a grant of land for himself and his followers with the threat of unending 
war if he did not receive it.
158
 Tiberius, after delivering a heated speech, charged Blaesus with the 
task of capturing Tacfarinas by any means at his command. Blaesus carried out a resourceful and 
successful campaign, during which he captured Tacfarinus‟ brother. He then returned to Rome: „too 
early, however for the interests of the province, for he left behind those who were capable of 
resuscitating the war.‟159 Tiberius awarded Blaesus the honour of being hailed imperator by his 
troops, treating the war as though it was complete.
160
 Tacitus implies that this was an empty honour.  
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Dolabella took up the war without the ninth legion, which had been ordered back to Pannonia by 
Tiberius, and according to Tacitus, Dolabella was too apprehensive of the Emperor‟s orders to 
protest.
161
. After a successful initial encounter with the troops that he had, Dolabella surprised 
Tacfarinas and his followers in their camp and slaughter ensued during which Tacfarinas died. 
Dolabella though was denied the triumphal ornaments he requested:  
out of deference to Sejanus, lest the praise for Blaesus, his uncle, might be tarnished. Yet 
Blaesus did not become more illustrious on that account, while the honour denied to the 
former [Dolabella] intensified his fame.
162
  
Dolabella had not endeared himself to Tiberius, which might be the actual reason for the refusal of 
triumphal honours. Tiberius simply did not trust him. Another view can be taken. Dolabella had 
suggested an ovation for Tiberius when he returned from Campania and Tiberius reply was a 
sarcastic refusal and a rebuke. It was the rule that triumphs and ovations had to be requested in 
order for them to be granted. Tiberius had very sarcastically made the point that the ovation offered 
by Dolabella was not asked for and was not wanted so his refusal of Dolabella‟s request for 
triumphal insignia may have been Tiberius‟ way of hammering home his lesson.163 
This war was of some importance to Rome in that Africa was Rome‟s corn basket. Tacfarinas could 
have threatened that supply. Tacitus‟ segmenting of it does not do justice to its importance.164 The 
various governors had some trouble containing and then defeating Tacfarinas. Tacitus appears to be 
writing about this war in order to show the growing power of Sejanus over Tiberius, through the 
awards given to his uncle Blaesus. As Mendell says: „Tacitus weaves this war into his narrative and 
seizes upon its political aspects to integrate it with his dramatic tale of Tiberius.‟165 Tiberius was 
certainly wary of successful generals with large armies, though it does not seem to have influenced 
his choice of generals for this war despite Tacitus‟ less than admiring view of Tiberius. Camillus 
was inexperienced, but L. Apronius and Blaesus were both tried and tested generals.  
 
GNAEUS DOMITIUS CORBULO 
Finally, Tacitus‟ treatment of Cn. Domitius Corbulo must be examined, since this enigmatic figure 
takes up much of the books covering Nero‟s reign. Corbulo appears in Tacitus only as a general in 
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the provinces he commands, removed from Roman politics, and, in the extant part of the Annals, 
largely unaffected by them. His portrayal in the Annals is in the nature of a eulogistic biography.
166
 
Mendell writes that it can hardly be doubted that Tacitus would have given to Corbulo‟s death the 
same treatment that he has given to Thrasea Paetus.
167
  It is true that Tacitus devotes more time to 
Corbulo‟s campaigns than to those of any other general. Tacitus‟ portrayal of Corbulo takes up a 
good deal of the books during which Nero‟s depraved character is on display, and when the 
persecution of prominent men and women is described. Tacitus‟ portrayal of Corbulo as a dedicated 
general is specifically designed to contrast with the depraved actions of the emperor Nero. Ash, in 
fact, compares Corbulo with Lucullus, cos. 74 BC. The military man, Corbulo, is the professional 
Lucullus, while the self-indulgent Nero is the retired Lucullus.
168
 In other words, Corbulo is 
Lucullus at his best, an active, energetic and successful general, while Nero is Lucullus retired, 
living a life of luxury and dissipation. Tacitus also uses specific language in his depiction of this 
general. For example, the term gloria is constantly applied to Corbulo or to enterprises in which he 
is engaged. Tacitus uses it in connection with Corbulo more than he applies it to any other character 
in the Annals, including Germanicus.
169
 
Corbulo is introduced at Ann. 11.18-20, when he appears as the governor of Lower Germany, 
putting down the uprising caused by the auxiliary deserter Gannascus. Having achieved this he 
crossed the Rhine and built a fort there. This caused consternation in Rome and Claudius, recalled 
him back across the Rhine.
170
 This passage also contains an account of Corbulo‟s having to instil 
discipline into the army which is very reminiscent of the same actions that Corbulo had to perform 
when he went into the east to take up the campaign „to retain Armenia‟ ( retinendae  Armeniae.)171 
In both Germany and in Armenia, so Tacitus would have us believe, Corbulo found his armies in 
disarray.
172
 I would suggest that the two accounts of the disciplining of the two different armies is 
an example of Tacitus‟ self-imitation as he reuses a theme to show the importance of the general.173 
It is highly unlikely that the armies in two frontier provinces would have been allowed to decline so 
badly. As Wheeler points out, the German legions never had a reputation for slack discipline, while 
the eastern legions may simply have needed retraining to harden Corbulo‟s recruits for the harsh 
campaigning conditions to the north of the Taurus Mountains.
174
 In each case Tacitus wishes to 
highlight Corbulo as a stern disciplinarian, and there can be little doubt that he was. Tacitus does 
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say in the instance of Germany that some of these tales of Corbulo‟s harsh discipline may be 
exaggerated or false.
175
  
Another interesting point is the comparison of Corbulo with Lucullus, cos. 74 BC made by Ash.
176
 
Ash sees a parallel with Lucullus in Tacitus‟ portrayal of Corbulo in the east. There are certainly 
similarities. At Ann. 13.8, Tacitus describes Corbulo as „mighty in physique as he was, a man of 
magnificent words and, in addition to his experience and wisdom, impressive even in the 
irrelevancies of display‟.177 Plutarch describes Lucullus in Armenia: „he was tall and handsome, a 
powerful speaker and equally able in the forum or on the battlefield.‟178 To this comparison we can 
add that according to Plutarch, Lucullus would not cooperate with men even equal to himself.
179
 
This finds an echo in Tacitus‟ assertion that Corbulo was intolerant of rivals.180 Tacitus himself 
reports that Corbulo deemed it worthy of the greatness of the Roman people to recover what had 
once been acquired by Lucullus and Pompeius.
181
 Ash further highlights the fact that Corbulo, 
according to Tacitus, entered Armenia in 63 using the route once taken by Lucullus.
182
 One point 
that we can add to Ash‟s analysis is that Lucullus too had to contend with legions spoiled by 
luxuriousness and greed when he went to Asia, and was forced to retrain them. This is another 
similarity between the two generals that should be taken into account, as should the fact that 
Lucullus, also, was known to be a stern disciplinarian.
183
 In the final analysis, though, Ash puts 
Tacitus‟ tendency to evoke Lucullus down to an agenda set by Corbulo himself.184 The allusions to 
Lucullus may be propaganda, as Gilmartin believes or more likely, they are a literary device 
developed by Tacitus himself, portraying a general he admired and one whom he intended to 
immortalise as one of Nero‟s victims as the successor of his illustrious Republican predecessors.185  
In order to gain a greater appreciation of Tacitus‟ portrayal of Corbulo, it is necessary to study his 
use of language in depth. Initially, Tacitus relates that Corbulo‟s appointment to the command in 
Armenia was welcomed gladly. As Tacitus states, Corbulo‟s appointment was: „a situation that 
seemed to have thrown open a place for the virtues.‟186 During the Republic, „virtus‟ was the manly 
virtue to be sought after by those in the senatorial order who controlled the armies, and even by the 
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common soldier.
187
 „Virtus‟ was predominately martial, and as Levick says, it was through „virtus‟ 
that „gloria‟ and „imperium‟ were obtained. 188 However, under the principate, „virtus‟ was the 
prerogative of the imperial family and certain trusted generals.
189
 Therefore Tacitus is implying that 
Corbulo was one of these trusted generals and that this „virtus‟ led to the „gloria‟ that is discussed 
below.  
Tacitus‟ subsequent language suggests that he regarded Corbulo highly. The term „gloria‟ is applied 
to Corbulo, his enterprises or used by him to exhort his troops more times than it is with any other 
general, or indeed, emperor. The term first occurs when Corbulo is in Germany: At Corbulo 
provinciam ingressus magna cum cura et mox gloria, cui principium illa militia fuit  (But Corbulo 
having entered the province with great care and soon with the the glory which dates from this 
campaign).
190
 At 13.39, Corbulo tells his troops to strike for sedibus gloriaeque (spoils and glory). 
At 13.41, there was no utilitas aut gloria (profit or glory) in leaving Artaxata intact. At 15.6, 
Corbulo meritae tot per annos gloriae non ultra periculum faceret (Corbulo should risk no further 
the glory earned in the course of so many years.) In comparing Caesnnius Paetus with Corbulo 
Tacitus says: et Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur despiciebat gesta (and 
Paetus for whom it might have been glory enough to rank second to such a leader, distained his 
deeds).
191
 Corbulo, in exhorting his troops to rescue Paetus‟ legions pointed to novam gloriam. 
(new glory).
192
 During Corbulo‟s diplomatic meeting with Vologaeses, Tacitus reports: Corbuloni 
non vitatus ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret (it was not avoided by Corbulo, who wished 
the contrast to enhance his glory).
193
 Finally, at 15.30, Addidit gloriae Corbulo comitatem 
epulasque (to his glories, Corbulo added courtesy and a banquet).   One passage in particular, the 
passage at 15.6, has led modern historians to infer that the use of „gloria‟ is Tacitus‟ attempt to 
criticise Corbulo.
194
 In fact, a careful reading of the passage shows that these are the sentiments of 
detractors that Tacitus relates, after reporting that most men acclaimed Corbulo‟s actions as a 
magnificent accomplishment. As Sullivan says in his account of „gloria‟ under the Republic, it was 
the high reward of notable service to the State; moreover it was a form of immortality, satisfying the 
natural craving of great men to live on after death.
195
 Taken with his reference to Corbulo following 
the way that Lucullus had taken, Tacitus clearly presents Corbulo as a general of Republican values, 
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seeking to glorify himself and Rome in the way that Lucullus had done in the Third Mithridatic war 
in 73-67 BC.
196
 
Significantly, there are similarities between the accounts of the campaigns of Corbulo and those of 
Germanicus. Tacitus said that both went bareheaded and that both took on the most dangerous tasks 
themselves.
 197
 Of course, these are standard comments on great generals, but Tacitus uses them to 
great effect with regards Corbulo and Germanicus.
198
 There is another echo of Germanicus. At Ann. 
2.14 Tacitus writes of a speech of Germanicus: 
Nor would there be a war beyond if only they would set him [Germanicus] as victor in the 
same country where he was treading in the footsteps of his father and uncle
199
 
Tacitus reports that Corbulo, before leading his army into Armenia after the failure of Caesennius 
Paetus, spoke „with all the weight which in a professional soldier was a fair substitute for 
eloquence‟.200 He then, according to Tacitus, trod the road that Lucullus had taken into Armenia. 
The similar ways in which Germanicus and Corbulo invoke great predecessors cannot have been 
accidental on Tacitus‟ part. It is evident from the texts that Tacitus admired both and deliberately 
tried to link their campaigns. The fact that Corbulo is not often mentioned by name suggests that 
Corbulo possessed that other Republican virtue, „modestia‟, which is also attributed to Germanicus 
at Ann. 2.58. The fact that „virtus‟ and through that „gloria‟ has already been applied to Corbulo‟s 
appointment to the eastern command is also highly significant.
201
 
Corbulo‟s energetic and successful campaigns are deliberately contrasted with Nero‟s activities in 
Rome. From chapters 14.15-22, Tacitus relates the increasing debaucheries of Nero. At Ann.14.21, 
Nero is shown taking part in the quinquennial games in Greek dress and being hailed as victor. At 
the same time, in chapter 14.22 the innocent Rubellius Plautus, who could trace his ancestry back to 
Augustus and was consequently seen as a rival to Nero, was exiled. Then, amid the debauchery and 
treachery, Tacitus returns in the next chapter to Corbulo, fresh from his success at Artaxata, aiming 
to take Tigranocerta by peaceful means if possible.   It is also interesting to note the year under 
which Tacitus places this campaign. He narrates that the taking of Artaxata and the campaign 
against Tigranocerta in 60.
202
 In fact, Artaxata must have been taken in 58 because Nero celebrated 
his sixth imperatorial acclamation for this on the 3
rd
 January 59.
203
 The troops probably wintered 
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there and then destroyed it on 30
th
 April 59 at the time of a solar eclipse reported by Pliny and 
recorded by Tacitus himself, because it was impossible to hold without a large garrison.
204
 The 
capture of Tigranocerta must have taken place soon after, probably in the campaigning season of 
that year. Tacitus‟ accounts of the year 59, though, are largely taken up with the murder of 
Agrippina, and so Tacitus has telescoped the campaigns of two years into one, the year 60. The 
reason for this is so that the effect of Agrippina‟s death at Nero‟s hands should not be interrupted by 
the narrative of Corbulo in the east. At the same time, by placing these campaigns in 60, Tacitus 
brings Corbulo to the fore as a figure of virtue and duty on the battlefield, a contrast to the depravity 
of the emperor amongst the debaucheries taking place in Rome after Agrippina‟s death. Likewise, at 
the end of book fourteen, the death of Octavia is described in pathetic detail, as she called on her 
relationship to the Germanici in an attempt to avert her fate. The change from this tragedy in Rome 
to the ordered campaigns of Corbulo again in the beginning of book fifteen comes as a shock to the 
reader, as was clearly Tacitus‟ intention. 
Tacitus presents Corbulo as a general in the Republican mould, stern, dedicated and pious, aware of 
the necessity of increasing his own glory and that of Rome, sharing the hardships of his men, 
magnificent of person and a capable orator, all necessary virtues for a  successful general. Corbulo 
was so successful in his endeavours that in 63 he was awarded the imperium that was given to 
Pompey against the pirates, in order to bring the campaign in Armenia to a successful conclusion 
after the failure of Caesennius Paetus:  
Corbulo knowledgeable of his soldiers and of the enemy for so many years was placed in 
charge of conducting affairs lest through someone else‟s ignorance there would be further 
mistakes, because Paetus had been a source of disgust.
205
 
Here again the language reminds the reader of Germanicus, the other general with imperium over 
provincial commanders in the east. Tacitus lauds both Germanicus and Corbulo at the expense of 
the emperor under which each served. In the Annals, Germanicus and Corbulo are a narrative pair in 
that they represent the device of bad emperor and excellent commander: Tiberius contrasting with 
Germanicus and Nero contrasting with Corbulo.
206
  In the extant portion of the Annals, Nero does 
not intrude into Corbulo‟s campaigns at all. There is no communication between the emperor and 
the general except as necessary to give him his orders. However Corbulo was condemned to death 
by Nero, which undoubtedly would have featured in the lost portion of the Annals, and it is in this 
light that Tacitus presents Corbulo‟s career: the dedicated servant of an undeserving emperor.  
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Tacitus‟ accounts of the campaigns of the senatorial generals in the Annals provide 
an insight into tensions within the reigning house.  This is highlighted by the language and narrative  
choices Tacitus makes in his portrayal of the relationship between Tiberius and Germanicus and 
later the general Silius and Tiberius after Germanicus‟ death. The generals‟ careers also focus the 
reader‟s attention on the growing power of Sejanus, as his uncle Blaesus is permitted to be hailed 
imperator, and Sejanus condemns Silius, old friend of Germanicus. The campaigns of Corbulo are 
interwoven into the narrative in order to contrast the energetic actions of the general with the 
depravities which Tacitus perceives in Nero. A historiographical analysis of Tacitus‟ Annals, 
therefore, helps us to understand Tacitus‟ own views towards the emperors more clearly and the 
careers of these generals are singularly important to that understanding. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 TACITUS AND THE WESTERN LEGIONS. 
The time after the death of Augustus was a period of great uncertainty since Tiberius was the first 
man to inherit the role of princeps. This caused consternation in the city and with the armies in the 
provinces as Tiberius appeared reluctant to take on the principate. Since the end of the civil wars, 
the army had been bound personally to Augustus and his death resulted in the mutinies in Pannonia 
and on the Rhine. The armies sought to take advantage of the civil war that they were sure would 
follow the death of Augustus. In this chapter therefore, I will firstly examine the mutinies in Book 
One of the Annals, which Tacitus uses to further his negative opinion of Tiberius. Secondly I will 
explore the war against Tacfarinas in North Africa and the revolts of Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul.  
These are wars that Tacitus exploits to advance his negative view of Tiberius and which have not 
received a great deal of attention from scholars.
207
 Tacitus‟ fragmented account of the war against 
Tacfarinus in particular is also vital to the understanding of the fact that the annalistic form was no 
longer suitable for the period in which Tacitus wrote.  Finally, the war with Boudica will be 
discussed. It will be argued that with the revolt of Boudica, Tacitus takes the opportunity to explore 
both the role of the army in the confrontation, and the political situation in Rome, in particular the 
growing debauchery of Nero. 
THE RHINE MUTINIES AND THE WAR IN GERMANY 
At Augustus‟ death, there was great uncertainty in the Roman world. Augustus had controlled 
Rome and the armies from 23BC until 14. During this period he had imposed on the Roman world a 
long period of peace and stability very different from the civil wars that ended the Republic. 
Therefore the transfer to the new princeps, Tiberius, was far from smooth as armies and senators 
alike wondered if civil war would return. The soldiers in the provinces regarded the transfer of 
power as an opportunity to demand higher pay and better service conditions, expecting that civil 
war would break out and there would be donatives from generals vying for power as at the end of 
the Republic.
208
 In fact, Tacitus in his introduction to the Pannonian mutiny contrasts the orderly 
condition of the affairs of the city with the „madness‟ to be found in the provinces.209  The mutinies 
in Pannonia and on the Rhine are of especial interest in the sense that Tacitus uses language to 
describe the soldiers that he does not even use with regard to the German tribesmen. This use of 
language by Tacitus emphasises the severity of the political instability at the time. In addition 
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Tacitus accentuates the methods used by Drusus in Pannonia as opposed to the less controlled 
methods used by Germanicus on the Rhine. When the armies on the Rhine were finally quieted and 
marched into Germany on a pillaging expedition, it is clear that Germanicus was not in control of 
the situation.  
During the Pannonian and Rhine mutinies, Tacitus‟ use of language is particularly significant and 
emphasizes Tacitus‟ view of the instability of Roman politics and the army itself. The term furor is 
constantly used by Tacitus during the mutinies, beginning with the one in Pannonia. For example 
postremo eo furoris venere, ut tres legiones miscere in unam agitaverint (At last they came to such 
a pitch of violent madness that they proposed to amalgamate the three legions into one).
 210
 Only a 
disagreement as to which legion should take the lead prevented this from occurring. Again at Ann. 
1.35.5:  
Saevum id malique moris etiam furentibus visum, ac spatium fuit quo Caesar ab amicis in 
tabernaculum raperetur. 
Even to that crowd of madmen the act seemed brutal and ill conditioned, and there followed a 
pause long enough for Caesar‟s friends to hurry him into his tent.  
Even the word raperetur used here has violent overtones, as it can be used in the sense of „to 
plunder‟.211 It adds to the tenseness of the whole situation, that Germanicus had to be snatched away 
from his army. Furor is used again at 1.40.2, 1.42.1 and 1.49.3, on the latter occasion to describe 
the mentality of the soldiers as they demand that Germanicus lead them into Germany. Their mood 
is described as truces (savage) and they desired piaculum furoris (atonement for their madness). 
Furor seems to be attached to accounts of mutinies as it also occurs in Livy‟s account of the speech 
of Scipio Africanus Maior to the mutineers in Spain in 206 B.C.: „Say that not all of you did that, 
soldiers, or wished it done; that it was the frenzy and folly of a few.‟212 In fact in Africanus‟ speech, 
Livy uses the word furor twice. This shadow of Livy and Scipio Africanus in Tacitus calls to mind 
the Republic, a subject never far from Tacitus‟ mind in his Annals. According to Tacitus, the furor 
had its root in the legions‟ belief that a change of sovereign gave them the hope of the benefits of 
civil war, although, as Tacitus says, there were no fresh grievances.
213
 Here, though he is relating a 
battle, Tacitus focuses our attention on the events taking place in Rome, which if not resolved could 
have made the civil war a reality. 
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Tacitus uses another term for madness during the mutinies, rabies. inferioris exercitus miles in 
rabiem prolapses est (the lower army lapsed into a frenzy).
214
 The term is used again by 
Germanicus in his speech to the legions during the mutiny: fatalem rabiem (fated frenzy). 
215
 This is 
an interesting use of the word which is also used to describe mad or rabid dogs, a strong and rather 
derogatory term to use of soldiers. The intimation may be that the corpus of the legion is „diseased‟ 
by the mutiny. Vecordia (a derangement of the mind) and lymphati  derived from the verb lympho, 
meaning to be in a state of frenzy, or again, a state of derangement of the mind are terms also used 
to describe the mutineers.
216
 Indeed, Woodman likens Tacitus‟ use of language to terms used to 
express physical illness.
217
 I disagree with Woodman who takes lymphati to be derived from 
lympha, water in the poetic sense, and to be suggestive of a water related disorder of the mind 
suggestive of the German swamps.
218
 Here Woodman appears to be looking too far afield for terms 
with which to support his thesis. The use of the verb lympho is quite sufficient to give the vital 
sense of insanity that Tacitus portrays as affecting the legions. Tacitus further enhances the feeling 
of disorder in the mutineers by the terms with which he describes them. Vulgus is used to describe 
the legions at the beginning of the Pannonian mutiny, a term for a crowd with derogatory overtones, 
and another word that is often used to describe a pack of animals. This is in keeping with the word 
rabies mentioned above.
219
 Vernacula multitudo is also used of those who Tacitus describes as the 
ringleaders of the German mutiny.
220
 This can have the connotation of „slave born‟ or „urban 
rabble‟ and refers to the recruitment carried on by Augustus in the city after the Varian disaster. 
Cassius Dio says that they were „taken from the group in the city‟.221 Again Tacitus‟ terms are very 
unflattering. Overall, Tacitus‟ language in his description of the mutiny and mutineers is of a 
violent and highly condemnatory manner. Kajanto writes that in Tacitus the soldiery were of 
secondary importance.
222
 Here Tacitus brings them to the fore in his need to show the ferocity of the 
mutinies. At the same time, Tacitus‟ portrayal of the army here reflects his larger theme, depicted 
throughout the Annals, of the conflict and tension that he sees reflected in the principate as a whole. 
He represents this as being particularly rife at the time of transition from the rule of Augustus to that 
of Tiberius. 
Tacitus represents the differences in the attitude of the soldiers in the Pannonian and Rhine mutinies 
by contrasting the two generals in charge of the mutinies. In writing of the mutiny in Pannonia, 
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Ross states: „Clearly it is an oversimplification to assume that Tacitus is in the process of building a 
picture of a weak and ineffectual Drusus, saved only by chance: fors.
223
 This is a very just 
observation as Tacitus describes Drusus as having „a natural bias towards savagery‟.224 This belies 
any charge of weakness. However, they are hardly words intended to give a good opinion of 
Drusus, as opposed to his opinion of Germanicus: mira comitas (remarkable friendliness).
225
 
Tacitus‟ rather negative view of the son is probably a reflection of Tacitus‟ views on the father. 
Although Drusus was fortunate in the appearance of the eclipse, he, with sapientiam (wisdom), 
turned the eclipse to good effect. He was favoured by fors, but he then handled the mutiny with 
firmness and ability.
226
 The first advice given to Drusus was that they should be lenient with the 
troops and await the return of the embassy to Tiberius. Drusus chose the second option, to punish 
the guilty.
227
 Only the ringleaders were put to death, along with a few of their henchmen, belying 
Drusus‟ reputation for „savagery‟. As Pelling writes: „Suggestively Drusus‟ harshness produces less 
bloodshed than Germanicus‟ openness. The warmer style does not always work.‟228 Again, Tacitus 
remarks on the attitude of the soldiers at this time. He relates that: „then so pliable to superstition 
are minds so demoralised, they began to bewail the eternal hardships thus foreshadowed.‟229 Also at 
Ann.1.16.3 at the beginning of the mutiny, Tacitus describes the soldiers as having imperitos 
animos (ignorant minds).
230
 He presents the picture of primitive superstitious minds at work during 
and at the end of the crisis, overcome by the calm demeanour and authority of Drusus. Drusus here 
is the representative of imperial authority that quells the soldiers‟ discontent, and his authority 
represents the autocracy into which the state had fallen, an ongoing theme of the Annals.
231
 
Germanicus‟ handling of the German mutiny is related by Tacitus in greater length than that settled 
by Drusus. According to Tacitus, the mutiny in Germany came about from the same causes, that is, 
the desire for higher pay and fewer years of service. However, Germanicus is portrayed as engaging 
in subterfuge when he produces a letter supposedly from Tiberius. His theatricality is shown as he 
prepares to stab himself when offered the throne by the legions.
232
 He shows none of the force of 
character that is obvious in Tacitus‟ portrayal of Drusus. However Germanicus‟ character seems to 
have engaged Tacitus‟ interest since he examines it in more detail, with more colourful language 
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and with a „stylistic brilliance‟ unlike that given to the account of Drusus‟ actions.233 Tacitus 
describes Germanicus thus:  
For the young man had the instinct of an ordinary citizen and a remarkable affability quite 
different from Tiberius‟ conversation and look, arrogant and dark as they were.234  
 He is given an air of glamour and his achievements magnified in a manner that is not justified 
either by his actions in the mutiny or in the German wars themselves.
235
 Germanicus‟ amiability 
was not equal to the containment of the mutiny in Germany. Tacitus‟ Germanicus lacked the force 
of character to cow the soldiers into obedience. Drusus had fors in the appearance of the eclipse; 
Germanicus invented his own fors by sending away his wife and children. Tacitus‟ admiration 
notwithstanding, Germanicus does not appear in a good light especially in the savage punishments 
that he allowed after the mutiny was settled. 
For all Drusus supposed bias towards savagery, he completed the Pannonian mutiny with little 
bloodshed. The appalling nature of Germanicus solutions to the mutiny cannot have failed to strike 
Tacitus, despite his obvious admiration for Germanicus. It was the soldiers who suffered as a result 
of Germanicus‟ „gentler‟ approach. Firstly there was the brutal murder of those accused of mutiny 
and then the sentencing of the centurions. Tacitus describes the slaughter of the soldiers: „The 
soldiers revelled in the butchery, which they took as an act of absolution.‟236 Finally there was 
Germanicus‟ ultimatum to Caecina: „Caesar therefore arranged for the dispatch of arms, vessels and 
auxiliaries down the Rhine, determined, if his authority were rejected to try conclusions by the 
sword.‟237 The subsequent slaughter of soldiers by their fellows in Caecina‟s camp was equally as 
savage, if not more so, than that which had taken place previously in the camp of Germanicus. The 
Romans had a real horror of civil war, and yet this was what Tacitus has Germanicus threaten the 
legions of Caecina with if they don‟t carry out their own „absolution‟. This is the very spectre which 
Tacitus has raised as the cure for the mutineers.  Legion is to be set against legion. As Tacitus 
himself says: „No civil war of any period has presented the features of this.‟238 Here Tacitus is using 
the brutality of Germanicus‟ actions to emphasise the insecurities in these early years of the 
principate: Augustus was dead, the princeps was in an uncertain position and the legions are 
mutinying. Civil war threatened the state! Therefore Tacitus‟ description of Germanicus‟ reaction to 
the results of his threats comes as somewhat trite and hard to understand: „This is not a cure but a 
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calamity, he said with many tears.‟239 One might ask with perfect validity what did Germanicus 
expect after such a threat? Tacitus‟ hero does not come well out of the German mutiny. He appears 
to be one ready to evade or to slough off responsibility.
240
 Also, Germanicus hesitated to carry out 
action that reflected badly upon himself. He preferred others to incur the infamy.
241
 Tiberius‟ 
moderate response was understandable: 
 News of all this affected Tiberius with delight; he rejoiced at the suppression of the mutiny 
but, because Germanicus had won the soldiers good will by lavishing money and speeding 
their discharge, and also owing to his military glory he was tense.
242
 
Tiberius in fact had reason to be tense, based on his own long experience of war against the 
Germans.
243
 Germanicus‟ actions in crossing into Germany were not strictly legal, since Tiberius 
kept the boundaries of the Roman Empire within the limits set by Augustus, meaning that the 
boundary was the western bank of the Rhine.
244
 Germanicus had breached this boundary and stirred 
up war. The triumph awarded to Germanicus in 15 was undoubtedly, apart from other connotations 
described in chapter one, an attempt to bring him home and prevent him from doing further damage.  
A further aspect that needs to be addressed is Germanicus‟ visit to the field of Varus‟ disaster. This 
is an event in which Tacitus shows Germanicus acting in a self-indulgent manner in taking the 
troops to the scene of Rome‟s most feared disaster. However, Woodman sees in Tacitus‟ account of 
Germanicus‟ visit to the field of the Varian disaster a parallel to the visit of Vitellius to the 
battlefield of Bedriacum in 69.
245
 Woodman argues that Tacitus received his inspiration for the visit 
to the Varian field in his own description of Vitellius‟ visit to Bedriacum, which Tacitus had just 
described in his Histories. There are certainly similarities. Both Vitellius and Germanicus saw the 
remains of men and horses, the lost spears, altars that had been built in the case of Germanicus for 
the victims of Arminius and in the case of Vitellius for the victims of the battle. There were also 
present in both accounts men who had survived the battle who could point out where the various 
actions had taken place and with the exception of Vitellius himself, some of his companions were 
overcome with pity, as were Germanicus and his men. The accounts are too close in detail to 
dismiss the fact that Tacitus may have been tempted to reuse his earlier materials in his description 
of Germanicus‟ visit to the field of Varus. This is an instrument he also uses in his discussion of 
Corbulo‟s legions, as will be discussed below. 
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 It is significant that Caecina himself almost met the same disaster as Varus after they had left 
Varus‟ battlefield. This is one of Tacitus‟ most inspired pieces of writing, in his description of the 
horrors facing Caecina and his army in the midst of the German swamps. The very fear of the 
legions is almost tangible as Tacitus describes the marshes where they were weighed down by their 
loricas and their spears could not find purchase in the boggy ground: locus ulgine profunda; idem 
ad gradum instabilis, precedentibus lubricus; corpora gravia loricis; neque librare pila inter undas 
poterant.
246
 Here indeed, with the alliteration using the words ulgine, instabilis, lubricus, loricis, 
liberare, and pila could the word lympha be said to apply to the conditions in which the legions 
were trapped. The alliteration gives a fine sense of the liquidity of the surroundings that the Romans 
found themselves in, as does the later account of the horror night that the Romans spent after their 
first abortive battle against the German tribes. In his account of the ordeal of Caecina and his 
legions Tacitus finds a subject for his most florid rhetorical style.  
In the actions of the soldiers and the generals in the mutinies, Tacitus has found a subject that he 
could develop in a highly dramatic manner while at the same time pointing out the internal 
instability as Tiberius takes up the reins of government in Rome. It is clear that Tacitus has a 
negative view of Tiberius as he attempts to take on the mantle of Augustus in the troubled period of 
the accession. In the Pannonian and Rhine mutinies Tacitus has the means to bring to prominence 
the topic that was of greatest concern, that is, the weakness in the principate, following the death of 
its founder Augustus and the uncertainty that followed. 
 
THE WAR AGAINST TACFARINAS IN NORTH AFRICA. 
According to the Annals the war against Tacfarinus began in 17 and continued until 24. Ginsburg 
writes that the campaigns in Africa are but interludes in Tacitus‟ narrative of internal affairs.247 This 
is a just observation in that Roman affairs intrude in what was a long running campaign. Internal 
affairs are in no way affected by it, though the campaign itself may have had great importance to 
the welfare of Rome.
 248 
 In addition, the fragmentary presentation of this war in the Annals reflects 
the uncertainty in the early years of Tiberius‟ reign.  
In Rome, the first period of this war is taken up with Germanicus‟ consulship. Then it is interrupted 
by Germanicus‟ voyage to Egypt and his death in the east, followed by the actions and the trial of 
Piso. Consequently the account of the war is fragmented, and as a result its importance is lessened 
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in the eyes of the reader as Tacitus relates events that seem to him of more importance in Rome 
itself and in the east. Tacitus deviates from his annalistic form in his discussion of this war, thus 
belittling its importance to Rome.  
The North African Tacfarinas was a Numidian who had served as an auxiliary with the Roman 
army, presumably the III Augusta Legion which was the only legion to be assigned to the whole of 
the north coast of Africa.
249
 Its territory covered the entire region from Castellum Dimmidi in the 
Saharan Atlas to Bu Njem in south east Tripolitania, an area of roughly 1500 kilometres.
250
 Firstly 
he organised a group of bandits, which he trained along military lines and then convinced the 
Musulamii to join him, and with them came the Mauri, both Numidian tribes. With the Mauri came 
their leader Mazippa who became Tacfarinas‟ co-commander in the war. Further, using his military 
experience, Tacfarinas assembled them in a camp and organised them along the lines of legionary 
discipline.
251
 Tacfarinas was initially defeated by Furius Camillus with the one legion and 
auxiliaries in 17. However, Tacfarinas survived and the guerrilla warfare continued for seven years 
until 24, although it is only related in the Annals in isolated sections. It took the terms of office of 
four generals to defeat Tacfarinus completely.
  
Syme writes that Tacfarinas was an obvious pendant to Jugurtha, and that the Numidian War 
showed speed and movement that was a relief from the affairs in Rome under Tiberius.
252
 This is in 
line with Tacitus‟ own expressed view of the sorrowful nature of Roman politics. According to 
Woodman, „Tacitus‟ imitation of Sallust‟s style is neither casual nor perfunctory but all pervasive 
and it has implications beyond the mere stylistic.‟253 The style is evident in Tacitus‟ language which 
is highly reminiscent of Sallust. Sallust‟s brevity, abruptness and phraseology are faithfully 
reproduced.
254
  At Ann 3.21.4 Tacitus writes: 
Yet Tacfarinus, the Numidians now shocked and spurning blockades, spread the war,  
yielding wherever there was pressure and contrariwise reverting to his opponents rear; and as 
long as that remained the barbarians‟ method, he mocked with impunity the thwarted and 
exhausted Roman. 
Sed Tafarinas perculsis Numis et obsidia aspernantibus spargit bellum, ubi instaretur cedens 
ac rursum in terga remeans et dum ea ratio barbaro fuit, inritum fessumque Romanum 
impune ludificabatur. 
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This is reminiscent of Sallust at BJ 34.2:  
He promised surrender, and then feigned fear, gave way to the consul‟s attack and then, that 
his followers might not lose courage, attacked in his turn; thus baffling the consuls now by the 
delays of war and by now those of peace.
 255
 
 
polliceri deditionem ac deinde metum simulare, cedere instant et paulo post, ne sui 
diffiderent, instare; ita belli, modo pacis mora consulem ludificare. 
 
Ludificare typifies the teasing guerrilla tactics of tribesmen who would not be brought to a pitched 
battle.
256
 The use of the words cedere and ludifare in both accounts are significant in the sense that 
they show how closely Tacitus was following his role model, Sallust. However in doing so Tacitus 
deviated from his annalistic format. This disruption of the annalistic format mirrors overall the 
disruption that Tacitus portrays within the empire itself at this time in Tiberius‟ rule, with the death 
of Germanicus, and the subsequent problems in the Middle East that led to the trial of Piso. 
As shown above, in North Africa, Tacitus finds his own Bellum Jugurthinum.
257
 Tacitus‟ war 
covers a period of seven years and like the Bellum Jugurthinum it took four generals to complete. 
Unlike the Bellum Jugurthinum, though, three of the generals, Camillus, Apronius and Blaesus won 
triumphal insignia, whereas the last general, Dolabella did not. This is in contrast to Sallust where 
the last general of his war Marius, was awarded a triumph.
258
 This draws a poignant contrast 
between past and present.
259
 Finally, in his war in North Africa, Tacitus mirrors Sallust in that, like 
Sallust, he was more interested in portraying the political events in Rome than the war that he was 
narrating, hence its fragmentary presentation and his departure from the annalistic format.  
 The first part of the war under the command of Camillus was taking place while Germanicus was 
being assigned to the east. The war appears to be over as Tacitus returns in the next chapter to 
Germanicus taking up his consulship in Nicopolis on his way to the east in 18.
260
 The actions of the 
legions and the conduct of the war take second place to what seemed to Tacitus the more important 
events surrounding Germanicus and res internae. Several chapters are taken up with the actions of 
Germanicus, his death in 19 and Piso‟s trial in 20, before the war in North Africa is again 
addressed. According to Tacitus the war was renewed in 20, under the command of L. Apronius 
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who had replaced Camillus as governor of Africa.
261
 The question must be raised as to whether the 
war had terminated with Camillus and begun again with L. Apronius, or whether it had continued to 
be fought, though not mentioned by Tacitus due to his concentration on Germanicus. Certainly there 
is evidence that the war continued during this period. Although Tacitus only mentions in the year 24 
that Ptolemy Juba II was called on to aid the Romans, victory coins of Juba II dated to the years 
18/19 indicate that the war was ongoing and that he was there then.
262
 Tacitus implies this himself 
when he states: „Only that year (24) relieved the Roman people from the long-time war against the 
Numidian Tacfarinas.‟263 Tacitus is clearly implying, despite his own presentation of it, that the war 
was continuous. 
With L. Apronius‟ victory, the war is again treated by Tacitus as being ended and he returns to 
affairs in the capital. Affairs in Rome were centred on Tiberius‟ removal to Campania with Drusus, 
as joint consul with his father, taking up the responsibilities in Rome itself. It was in the following 
year, 21, with L. Apronius apparently returned to Rome, that Tiberius asked the senate to choose a 
candidate for the continuation of the war. North Africa was a senatorial province, and Tiberius left 
the choice to the senate. The emperor was defeated in this move by the senate‟s passing the choice 
back onto him. North Africa was a senatorial province and Tiberius‟ bid to allow the senate to select 
their own candidate was an attempt on Tiberius‟ part to give the senate a chance at independent 
action. Tacitus though, writes of the eventual choice of Blaesus, Sejanus‟ uncle, that was forced by 
the senate on Tiberius in such a manner that it reflects detrimentally on the unfortunate emperor: 
Blaesus was Sejanus‟ uncle and for that reason highly effective in terms of power. Blaesus 
replied with a display of reluctance, but not with the same assertiveness and was won over by 
sycophants.
264
 
Tacitus is thus insinuating that Tiberius was involved in the choice of general influenced by 
Sejanus. Though bound by actual historical facts, Tacitus uses innuendo to achieve his purpose, 
which is to portray Tiberius as a dark and menacing figure. 
Ginsburg writes in relation to the North African war and other campaigns of this period: 
 Not only does Tacitus choose to emphasise internal affairs, not external matters, within the 
annual account, but […] Tacitus‟ particular approach to his material within the annalistic 
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framework is not merely a question of the subject matter available to him, but of his treatment 
of it.
265
 
Further she goes on to add: 
There is no recurring pattern in Tacitus‟ overall selection of material year by year, because 
that form was no longer consistent with the true nature of the government at Rome.
266
 
Tacitus‟ account of this war and the actions of the army and its generals is vital therefore to show 
that the annalistic form was no longer suitable for the period in which Tacitus wrote. The years 
were numbered now by the emperor‟s reign, though Tacitus does list the consuls where he can. The 
war against Tacfarinas, though, tested Tacitus‟ annalistic form to the limit to the extent that he 
deleted whole sections of the war in order to focus on what he considered more important, affairs in 
Rome. 
Certainly there is no pattern to Tacitus‟ placement of the sections of the war as he relates them. The 
beginning of the war under Camillus is placed at the end of 17, and it is confirmed as ongoing in 
that year.
267
  The outbreak in 20 is placed somewhere in the middle of his account of that year. This 
starts with: „In the same year, Tacfarinas, whose defeat by Camillus in the previous summer I have 
mentioned‟ (eodem anno Tacfarinas, quem priore aestate pulsum a Camillo memoravi).268 Priore 
aestate is incorrect, as three years had passed since the victory of Camillus.
269
 The rest of the 
account of 20 is taken up with res internae including the trial of Piso and Germanicus‟ son Nero 
assuming the toga virilis. Then early in 21, Tiberius relates to the senate that Tacfarinas has begun 
hostilities again, and asks them to choose a governor for the province to deal with him. The actual 
account of the campaign of the successful candidate, Blaesus, is not given until the end of 21. 
During that year, Tacitus relates the death of Sallustius Crispus, the great nephew of the historian 
Sallust, whom Tacitus describes as the „most illustrious writer‟ (florentissimus auctor), this 
„paragon‟ of writers who Tacitus tried so hard to emulate.270 The conclusion of Blaesus campaign is 
related at the end of 22. Not unnaturally the death of Drusus takes up a good part of the year 23, and 
the only mention of the war is to do with the trial of two men accused of supplying grain to 
Tacfarinas. So we know that he war was still ongoing.  
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Tacitus‟ account of the war against Tacfarinas is very fragmentary, and in many places misleading. 
Tacitus had bound himself to an annalistic format but did not hesitate to deviate from it when the 
necessity arose, and so he was related this war interspersed by res internae. There is no noticeable 
structure within the annalistic form whereby the war could be related with complete coherence. It is 
true that Tacitus listed the years by consuls when he could but he did not hesitate to run two years 
together when it suited his agenda. Therefore, this war is related in disjointed sections that confuse 
and even misrepresent the dating of it. In this war, Tacitus plainly could not adhere to his annalistic 
format and instead, as Ginsberg has shown, he uses the confusion to underline the chaos that he saw 
during the early years of the principate.  
The Revolts of Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul 
The revolts of Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir in Gaul began in 21, and were easily put down by 
the legions of Lower Germany and detachments garrisoned in Gaul itself.  The war and the actions 
of the armies gave Tacitus yet another opportunity to cast Tiberius in an adverse light and to 
underline the insecurity that he still perceived within the principate itself. Tacitus also takes 
advantage of this war to reveal his negative opinion of the readiness of Rome‟s inhabitants for 
warfare that he saw as part of the overall enervating effect of the principate. 
The families of both Florus and Sacrovir had gained citizenship from Julius Caesar (a fact that 
Tacitus explains was unusual in that time) and both were eminent men in their communities.
271
  The 
causes of the revolt according to Tacitus were dissatisfaction over taxation and the rapaciousness of 
the overseers.
272
 The conspirators believed that after the destruction of Germanicus, the legions 
were disaffected and would not move to arrest a revolt that the Roman people of the city would be 
physically unable to do.
273
 
For reasons that Tacitus does not make clear, Sacrovir fought in these engagements against Florus‟ 
force with the Romans, though bare-headed, in order, so Tacitus explains, that he should be 
recognised and not be hit by a Gallic javelin.
274
 The implication is that Sacrovir was already 
planning rebellion and did not wish to be killed by one of his own countrymen. Prisoners evidently 
told Tiberius of this but according to Tacitus he ignored the warnings and so fostered the war.
275
 
Tiberius is thus portrayed by Tacitus as an inactive princeps through his not taking any action on the 
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basis of these warnings. Florus was finally defeated by the legions of C. Silius, governor of Upper 
Germany and those of Visellius Varro. 
Sacrovir achieved an uprising of the Aedui. It was a more serious enterprise than that of Florus in 
that he won over the sons of the Gallic nobles being educated in Augustodunum, after he had taken 
the capital by force. Tacitus reports that his force numbered forty thousand, a fifth in legionary 
armour, others with native weapons and some dressed in the armour of gladiators.
276
 In addition, the 
forces were being encouraged by a disagreement between the Roman commanders, C. Silius, 
governor of Upper Germany and Visellius Varro, cos. 12, over who should conduct the war. Silius 
eventually won the command against Sacrovir from Varro.
277
 In an energetic campaign, Silius 
crushed Sacrovir‟s forces, and Sacrovir himself died.  
One point worth considering here is the perception that Tacitus places with the people of the 
provinces on the state of the Roman people and the army. Before the uprising, Tacitus reports the 
Gauls as saying:  
 The soldiery, they said was disaffected on hearing of the destruction of Germanicus; it was an 
exceptional moment to regain their freedom, if, while flourishing themselves, they only 
reflected how barren Italy was, how unwarlike the urban plebs, and that no effective element 
thrived in the armies except that which was foreign.
278
 
This belief of the Gauls is then contradicted by Tacitus‟ description of the enthusiastic attitude of 
the legions as they hurl into war against them: 
Then he [C. Silius] marched at full speed upon Augustodunum. The march was a race 
between standard bearers and even the private soldiers protested angrily against pausing for 
the usual rest or the long nightly bivouac: let them only see the rebels in front and be seen: it 
was enough for victory!
 279
 
The strong contrast between the speech Tacitus gives to the Gauls and the actions of the legions in 
these passages shows Tacitus‟ use of the army to belie the beliefs of the provincials. Despite the 
leavening of foreigners, the army is still a force to be reckoned with. However since Tacitus could 
not have known of the opinions of the Gauls, he is here drawing on personal feelings about the 
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enervation of the city inhabitants and their inability to defend the empire. Gone were the times 
when good Roman men left their fields and workshops to man the army and defend the res publica. 
They were weakened by what Tacitus saw as the enervating effects of towns.
280
 In Tacitus‟ view, 
the army was indeed made up of foreigners to the shame of Rome‟s inhabitants. Tacitus uses these 
two passages to offer his own opinion on the state of Roman men under the empire as opposed to 
their predecessors during the more glorious days of the Republic. 
The order of the army is also a foil for the disorder in Rome, as Tacitus further writes: 
All the people mourned for the state, but in many, hatred of the existing order and a craving 
for change were such that they exulted even in their own perils and lavished reproaches on 
Tiberius, who in this convulsion of affairs, could centre his attention on the memoranda of 
informers: „Was Sacrovir also to stand his trial before the senate? At last men had risen to 
check these letters of blood guilt by the sword! War itself was a welcome exchange for the 
horrors of peace.‟281 
Such words as „letters of blood guilt‟ (cruentas epistulas) seem out of place in this period of 
Tiberius‟ reign.282 Tiberius himself had not undertaken any large scale prosecutions at this date. 
According to Tacitus himself, Tiberius‟ reign was divided into three sections, one when he was 
under the influence of Livia, Germanicus and Drusus, one when he was under the influence of 
Sejanus and the last when he was free of all influences and gave in to crimes and degradations.
283
 
This passage seems to refer more to the last part of Tiberius‟ reign than to his position at this early 
stage, with Germanicus not long dead, and Drusus and Livia still alive. In fact in the following year, 
he asked the senate for tribunician powers for Drusus.
284
 Sejanus was only beginning his ascent. 
Tiberius at this time was still feeling his way in the principate. Even when C. Silius was brought to 
trial as mentioned above, it was at the behest of Sejanus and he was prosecuted by Varro the consul, 
probably in revenge for his replacing his father in the war against Sacrovir. Therefore this passage 
is more a reflection of Tacitus‟ dislike of Tiberius, and a reflection of the latter part of his rule than 
of any real feeling of the people in Rome at this time. According to Tacitus, Tiberius remained 
perfectly unaffected by rumours of uprisings perhaps through natural reserve or perhaps because he 
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had information that the disturbances were slighter than reported.
 285
 It was only after the end of the 
war that Tiberius wrote to the senate that there had been a war and that it and been successfully 
concluded.
286
 Tacitus in fact is implying that Tiberius was a passive emperor, though the real reason 
may be that the war against Tacfarinas in North Africa was continuing. Tiberius perhaps did not 
wish to spread despondency about yet another war. Here Tacitus has used the actions of the army to 
reflect on the character, whether or not it is accurate at this stage, of Tiberius. 
The revolts of Florus and Sacrovir underline Tacitus‟ views of the politics in Rome in this period. 
Tacitus shows that even at this stage of the principate, Tiberius was still facing uncertainty caused 
by the death of Germanicus, a reflection of the earlier period of unrest following the death of 
Augustus. He manages, as he relates this war, to give his own view of the deterioration of the 
manpower in Rome for their own defence. This is also another instance of Tacitus‟ use of res 
externae to reflect the mode of government used by Tiberius. That is that Tiberius was a passive 
emperor, remaining in Rome as opposed to Trajan, under whom Tacitus lived, who led his own 
troops to war.  
 
The War against Boudica 
As has been shown in other sections of this work, Tacitus deliberately interspersed the res internae 
with the res externae, but this is not the case with the revolt of Boudica. After the section that 
relates Nero‟s persecution of the innocent Rubellius Plautus and the account of Nero‟s 
luxuriousness which caused him to fall ill, Tacitus diverts to Corbulo‟s campaigns in Armenia. 
Then, in the beginning of 61, he returns, after only a very brief reversion to affairs in Rome, to the 
rebellion in Britain, which awards to it a sense of urgency. In the war against Boudica, the order of 
the troops in Britain contrast with the dissolute princeps at Rome. 
Tacitus gives a lengthy account of the invasion of Mona, whereas Cassius Dio only makes a brief 
note of this expedition, possibly due to the epitomised nature of his works.
287
 Tacitus used 
alliteration to a great degree in his description of the rebels opposing Suetonius as he crossed the 
narrow straight to the island. Tacitus uses a series of alliterative words to describe the Britons on 
Mona (feminis, Furiarum, ferali, faces, fundentes and fanaticum).
288
 These words, which 
encompass flames, emotional frenzy, the funereal and the feminine aspects describe the sight which 
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met the oncoming Roman troops as they crossed to Mona.
289
 The Roman troops were in fact 
momentarily taken aback at the sight and had to be spurred on by Suetonius who urged them not to 
be dismayed by a band of females and fanatics.
290
 Then the emotionless professionalism of the 
Roman army came to the fore as the soldiers advanced against the Britons.
291
 The stark contrast 
between the emotionalism of the Britons and the cold professionalism of the Roman soldiers is 
obvious and in the end, the Britons fell victim to their own fires (igni suo involvunt).
292
 The war is 
presented as a contrast between discipline and emotionalism and, with the references to women, 
possibly female against male.
293
 Notable too is his reference to the Britons as barbarorum.
294
 While 
Tacitus appears to appreciate and even to some extent approve of the Britons‟ struggle for freedom, 
he nevertheless sees them as a nation of barbarians. Walker‟s assertion that Tacitus saw in the 
Britons the „Noble Savage‟ is therefore open to question.295 Even so, Walker‟s claim that, in order 
to find a contrast to the servile senatorial society of Rome, Tacitus was forced to look at figures like 
Arminius, Caratacus, Calgacus and Boudica, is likely in that he may have shown an admiration for 
these figures as pursuers of freedom as opposed to the sycophancy that he perceived in the 
senate.
296
 However, that he regarded the whole race of Britons thus, as Walker claims is doubtful.  
On the other hand, the seeking of freedom by a foreign race serves as a vivid contrast to the servility 
of the senators and the debauchery in Nero‟s Rome. The weakness of the senate is a theme that 
Tacitus pursues throughout the Annals, and it is highlighted here, and follows on from what was 
mentioned earlier, when Tiberius asked the Senate for a candidate for the North African war and 
they could not choose. However, there is strong evidence for the condemnation in Tacitus, despite 
his general view of the Britons, of the exploitation and injustice that brought about the revolt of 
Boudica.
297
 It is notable also that Tacitus does not use the term libertas in connection with the aims 
of the revolt, though modern historians do use it in connection with the rebellion.
298
 Libertas was 
the watchword of those planning to restore the Republic and embodied the power of the old 
senatorial stratum.
299
 It would not be applied to barbarians. 
In her speech before the battle, Tacitus has Boudica claim: „It was customary, she knew, with 
Britons to fight under female generalship‟ (solitum quidem Britannis feminarum ductu bellare 
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testebatur).
300
 It is interesting to note here Tacitus‟ use of the word ductus to describe Boudica 
which is similar to the title dux which he applied to Suetonius Paulinus himself: „Then reassured by 
their general they incited each other never to flinch before a band of females and fanatics‟ (dein 
cohortionibus ducis et se stimulantes ne muliebre et fanaticum agmen pavescerent).
301
 Here Tacitus 
is placing the British queen on the same level as the Roman governor. Further, Tacitus has Boudica 
describe herself as one „sprung from great ancestors‟ (ut tantis maioribus ortam).302 It is common 
knowledge that the Romans feared and hated kingship. This was probably all the more so when the 
monarch was a foreign queen, as in the case of Cleopatra, Cartimandua and Boudica herself.
303
 This 
was beyond that which the Romans perceived to be the normal role of women. Further, Tacitus has 
Boudica recite all that was wrong with Roman rule in Britain. This has been called the aristocratic 
Roman rhetoric of dissent on Tacitus‟ part.304 It has been suggested that the war in Britain was a 
conflict between native feminine barbarian disorder and Roman male discipline.
305
 This could be 
read also as the contrast between the queen taking on the masculine role of leading an army and the 
effeminacy of the princeps Nero, who is recorded as marrying the freedman Pythagorus in 64.
306
 
Such a possibility is further enhanced when Tacitus has Boudica say at the end of her speech: 
„“Such was the purpose of a woman – the men might live and be slaves!”‟307 Here Tacitus gives a 
scathing indictment on the debauched Rome of Nero, and the servility of the senate as opposed to 
the fixed determination and courage of the British queen.  
 
Tacitus gives a brief and succinct account of the prelude to the battle and the battle itself which 
lends to it a sense of the urgency that must have prevailed at the time.
308
 Tacitus has chosen brevity 
to describe the lightning successes of the Britons and the stark military situation that the Roman 
soldiery faced.
309
 This makes for a fine contrast to the measured and resolute action taken by the 
Roman commander. Cassius Dio, on the other hand, gives a much longer and less convincing 
account, though he does say that the battle lasted all day, which is probably closer to the truth.
310
 It 
is doubtful that the battle would have been over in the short space that Tacitus seems to indicate. 
Nevertheless, Tacitus brilliantly describes the emotional excitement of the British forces, urged on 
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by Boudica, who stated that the Romans would not withstand their numbers and their noise.
311
 It is 
interesting to compare the words Tacitus uses regarding the Britons at Mona and those before the 
battle with Suetonius. At Mona Tacitus describes the religious fervour into which the Britons had 
whipped themselves; at the final battle Tacitus writes: „the multitude rejoiced‟ (turmas 
exsultabant).
312
 This is a fine contrast to the quiet, orderly ardor of the Roman forces as they waited 
in their ranks for the signal to advance.
313
 There is a sense of menace in that quiet disciplined troop 
as opposed to the loud disorder of the Britons, who had even brought their wives to watch the battle. 
As Suetonius Paulinus is portrayed as saying, „more women than soldiers met the eye.‟314 Also 
Suetonius dismisses with contempt the British actions as the noise of the barbarians and empty 
threats.
315
 Tacitus has Suetonius appeal to the motives of gloria and virtus which echo the old 
virtues of the Republic.
316
 The battle is then joined and Tacitus describes a clinical and efficient 
demolition of the British forces by the Romans. 
The course of the revolts and the battles are vividly told and Tacitus lends to it a sense of the horror 
that must have prevailed. Of the revolt, Martin writes: 
We are to be given what is almost an epic aristeia set off by graphic writing in which the 
horrendous and the pathetic, the heroic and the cowardly all play their part.
317
 
The horrendous element is the sack of Camulodunum, the pathetic is the account of those whose sex 
or age prevented them from leaving London when it was abandoned by Paulinus and perhaps the 
slaughter of the British women by the Roman soldiers. The heroic concerns the acts of the Roman 
troops against vastly superior numbers, and the cowardly, the flight to Gaul of Catus Decianus who 
was responsible for the events that caused the revolt in the first place. Tacitus finally describes the 
victory of the Roman troops thus: „the glory won in that day was remarkable and equal to that of 
older victories.‟318 This is a reference to the order now established in Britain as against the disorder 
and dissipation in Neronian Rome, a reference to days past, the type of victory won under the more 
orderly days of the old Republic. Such a victory was to be lauded but it was not matched by the 
debauched situation in Rome. 
As Martin says, the rebellion of Boudica and its aftermath clearly required a reconsideration of 
policy and the replacement of Paulinus, with his policy of savage retribution, was a necessary 
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consequence.
319
 When the more aggressive Suetonius Paulinus was superseded by Petronius 
Turpilianus, Tacitus describes the result as „he imposed slothful idleness in the name of honest 
peace‟.320 Tacitus obviously disapproved of the new policy of Rome towards Britain, a peaceful 
settlement as opposed to the active suppression undertaken by Suetonius Paulinus after the revolt. 
Tacitus preferred a more aggressive policy such as that undertaken by his father-in-law Agricola in 
Britain than that which Rome adopted after the revolt of Boudica. At the same time, Tacitus uses 
the courage of Boudica and the legions themselves to highlight the servility of the senate and the 
extravagance and licentiousness that was being perpetrated in Nero‟s Rome. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been shown in chapter one of this work, Tacitus is hostile to Tiberius. Tiberius was unstable 
in his role in the early years of the principate in the aftermath of Augustus‟ death. The mutinies 
were a symptom of this unrest. The mutinies, the war against Tacfarinas and the rebellions of Florus 
and Sacrovir give Tacitus the opportunity to use the legions and their actions to further his negative 
opinions of this emperor. The intemperate language used by Tacitus to describe the armies in 
Germany reflects his dark opinion of Tiberius. In addition the uncertainties of the principate are 
underlined by Tacitus‟ deviation from his annalistic framework. Tiberius is shown as inactive as 
opposed to the bravery and energy of the legions, and Tacitus depicts the hostility of the senate 
towards him during the rebellion of Sacrovir.
321
 In addition Tacitus shows the problems within the 
functioning of the principate itself when the senate was unable to bring itself to decide on a 
candidate for the war against Tacfarinas, and fell back on the advice of Tiberius. Tacitus has also 
used the army, during the revolts of Florus and Sacrovir, to show the supposed provincial opinions 
of the inhabitants of Italy and Rome in particular, a reflection that is highly unflattering to Rome. 
This perhaps reflects Tacitus‟ own opinion of the decline of Roman and Italian manpower in the 
imperial period. Tacitus is scathing in his portrayal of the debauchery and indolence of Nero and the 
servility of the senate during his principate. Tacitus juxtaposes these views with the active and 
energetic legions in Britain and also the courage of the Britons, whom he portrays as fierce in their 
pursuit of justice. Finally, in the defeat of the Britons, Tacitus mentions the theme that pervades his 
Annals, the appeal for him of the orderliness of the old regime of the Republic, a utopian dream 
without substance even in the last days of the Republic itself.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TACITUS AND THE EASTERN LEGIONS 
Tacitus‟ portrayal of the eastern legions forms a counterpoint to what he claims were sorrowful res 
internae, as he examines the declining moral issues that he perceives in Nero‟s Rome. With the 
eastern legions the main antagonist was Parthia. Rome had been in a state of uneasy peace with 
Parthia since the reign of Augustus until Parthia began incursions onto Armenia in 54. The kingdom 
of Armenia was claimed by both Parthia and Rome which led to warfare in Nero‟s reign in the later 
books of the Annals. I will argue that Tacitus deliberately structures his narrative of these affairs so 
that they form a counterpoint to the degeneracy of the res publica in Rome. Tacitus firstly presents 
the eastern legions as being lax from luxuria, a situation which he perceives in Rome itself. Tacitus 
then introduces the talented general Corbulo who disciplines the legions and brings them back into 
fighting form. In this chapter I will first examine the Parthian Empire and the way in which Tacitus 
uses their perceived habits to reflect on his views of the legions in the east and the events in Rome. I 
will then turn to an analysis of Corbulo‟s campaigns which concluded for Rome fifty years of peace 
in the east.
322
 Corbulo‟s co-commander in the East L. Caesennius Paetus, who was responsible for 
the disastrous defeat in Armenia, is portrayed by Tacitus as the antithesis of Corbulo. I will argue 
that Tacitus intended to set Corbulo‟s ordered, successful campaigns against the disorder unfolding 
in Rome itself.   
PARTHIA 
It is impossible to examine the armies of the East in the Annals without first considering how 
Tacitus‟ writing is influenced by his views on Parthia. Tacitus devotes considerable attention to 
Parthian affairs in the Annals which forms a counterpoint to the sections on the affairs in Rome 
itself.
323
 Parthia was a large and powerful kingdom on the borders of the Roman east governed by 
an autocratic king and, like Rome, it dominated over vassal states.
324
 Possibly Tacitus saw Parthia 
as a mirror for the increasing autocracy which the principate was inflicting on Rome. In the last 
days of the Republic Parthia was Pompey‟s ally in his war against Mithridates of Pontus but wars 
between Rome and Parthia took place later with the defeat of Marcus Licinius Crassus and with 
little success by Marcus Antonius.
325
 However a diplomatic solution was arranged by Augustus in 1 
whereby a Roman nominated Parthian ruler sat on the throne of Armenia.
326
 Tacitus notes the 
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Parthians‟ weaknesses: they were ineffective in siege situations, spurned distant campaigns and 
there was constant internal dissention in the Parthian ruling house.
327
 
328
 
In the Parthian battle scenes in book six there is a valid claim for much of it being rhetorical 
invention. As regards Tacitus‟ account of an entirely Parthian civil war in book 6.34-35 one might 
validly ask, as does Ash, how could Tacitus write with such authority on a civilisation that he had 
never visited and of which he could have had no personal knowledge.
329
 This brings into focus the 
question of how historiography was viewed by the ancients themselves. Battle scenes were added to 
works and „tempted historians to invention in order to amuse their reader.‟330 As mentioned in the 
introduction, Tacitus has been classed with the Latin poets, writers of fiction.
331
 Woodman suggests 
that we ought to be approaching ancient historians as writers of literature rather than writers of 
history.
332
 This is a valid claim in as much as Tacitus‟ accounts of internal affairs in Parthia are 
largely literary contrivance meant to entertain the reader. This does not impinge upon the validity of 
much of Tacitus‟ history, but makes one aware that Tacitus did use literary invention when the 
occasion required it as was the case with Parthian affairs. Tacitus‟ portrayal of the Parthians 
therefore is not meant to be realistic, but rather to be set up as a counterpoint to Rome. 
In his writing of Parthian affairs Tacitus‟ work was more for the exercise of rhetorical skill than of 
pursuing actual fact.
333
 As already mentioned, Rome had enjoyed many years of uneasy peace with 
Parthia.  Civil war may have been anathema to Tacitus as he implies in the Histories, but as Kajanto 
writes, „Tacitus‟ admiration of war is clear in the emphasis that he puts upon the demoralising 
influence of long peace.‟334 In the beginning of the Histories Tacitus describes the senators as 
„incapacitated by age or enervated by a long peace‟ and he describes Corbulo‟s legions as „sluggish 
from long peace.
335
 He also describes the peace achieved after the revolt of Boudica as „sluggish 
inactivity‟.336 This is following a tradition of the ancients who believed that long peace sapped the 
vigour of the populace. Aristotle and Sallust both comment upon this.
337
 The accounts of war were 
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also the means of commemorating Roman valour and the deeds of illustrious Romans. Reports of 
wars on the whole were read for the excitement of a good story, which is how they were told. 
Historians used allusions that their readers would recognise as is evident in Tacitus‟ description of 
the aftermath of the defeat of the incompetent Caesennius Paetus at the Parthians‟ hands at 
Rhandeia in 62. In Tacitus‟ account the army was forced by the Parthians to march under the yoke, 
an ancient Roman punishment that the Parthians could have known nothing about, but would have 
made for a thrilling tale with its recollection of Republican mores.
338
 Campaigns and warfare in 
Tacitus, therefore, were not necessarily designed to be realistic, but depended on traditional topoi. 
Tacitus‟ depiction of the Parthians in the Annals, however, can go deeper than that. The themes of 
the Parthian narrative often mirror those of internal conflicts in Rome. Keitel writes: „the eastern 
sections draw him [the reader] back to the main narrative and often foreshadow the next step in the 
escalating quarrels among the Julio-Claudians.‟339 For example, the rivalry of the two Parthian 
princes, Mithridates and Pharasmenes at Ann. 11.8-10 foreshadows the rivalry between Domitius 
and Britannicus at Ann. 11.11.2.
340
 Similar language is used to describe the Parthians and those in 
power in Rome. The term ferox is used of Vardanes at Ann. 11.10.3 and Mithridates is described as 
atrox at Ann. 11.9.2. Agrippina is characterised by each of these terms at Ann. 12.22.1 and 13.3.3. 
The words saevtiam ac luxum are used to describe Gotarzes, who was Vardanes brother. At Ann 
11.12.1 and 11.31.2, Messalina succumbs to saevitia and luxus to her ruin.
341
 Gotarzes‟ slaughter of 
his own relatives foreshadows the murders by Agrippina of Lucius Silanus and Domitia Lepida, 
both descendants of Augustus, as well as the poisoning of Claudius, and Nero‟s murder of 
Britannicus and Octavia.
342
 Tacitus employs these incidents to explore the „pathology of 
despotism‟, showing that the internal discord in both imperial houses ironically binds Rome and 
Parthia together.
 343
  Moreover the way in which these events are structured in the narrative is of the 
utmost importance. Tacitus often places Parthian events at a crucial point in Roman affairs. At the 
end of the Parthian war in book six, Tacitus writes: „These achievements of two seasons I linked 
together to provide some mental respite from domestic affairs.‟344 Tacitus again uses the literary 
device of setting res externae against the internae even though in doing so, he departs from the 
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annalistic framework that he has set for himself.
 345
  Each section of the eastern war contained 
events of more than one year, though Tacitus tries to preserve the illusion of an annalistic 
framework.
346
 Then, at Ann.14.23, Tacitus turns to Corbulo‟s war against Parthia as a respite from 
the troubles in Rome, Agrippina‟s murder and Nero‟s subsequent debauchery. Tacitus presents us 
with Corbulo‟s success in the taking of Artaxata in Armenia and his subsequent march against 
Tigranocerta which is contrasted with the vicious emperor at home. It is against this background of 
Tacitus‟ careful manipulation of Romano–Parthian affairs, his perception of similarities within the 
Roman and Parthian houses and the luxus of the eastern provinces that we should situate his 
portrayal of the Roman Army. 
THE LAXITY OF THE EASTERN LEGIONS 
Since the eastern legions are portrayed as infected with luxuria, it is necessary to explore what 
luxuria meant to Rome and how it came to be applied to the legions themselves. Isaacs writes of 
Roman views of luxuria: „The writing of luxuriousness in the East is often influenced by an anti-
Oriental interpretation in historiography and usually starts from the introductory treatment of the 
wars between the Persians and the Greeks.‟347 Therefore in the historiographical tradition, the 
Romans believed luxury and lust to be agents of destruction both „particular and in general‟ and the 
East was believed to be the font of that luxury.
348
 Unsurprisingly therefore, the major charge 
directed against the legions of the East is laxity in discipline. The accounts of campaigns and 
warfare were not necessarily designed to be realistic and depended on traditional topoi. Laxity of 
the Eastern legions was one of these topoi. Laxity features prominently in the works of other 
writers. Livy reports that Manlius Vulso had corrupted the strict discipline of Scipio‟s legions in 
Asia, and that he introduced luxury to Rome.
349
 Lucullus was said to have inherited legions in the 
east spoiled by luxury and greed.
350
 Caesar mentioned in his Commentaries that the Alexandrian 
army was ruined by luxury, lax discipline, looting and greed.
351
 Sallust tells us that Sulla allowed 
the soldiers in the East access to luxury and license foreign to their forefathers.
352
 Earlier Caesar 
had denigrated Pompey by accusations of lavish indulgence in the east.
353
 Fronto and Herodian, 
writing long after Tacitus, show that the tradition of luxury in the eastern legions continued to their 
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time.
354
 Fronto in fact writes in a similar vein of the laxity of the Syrian legions to Tacitus himself. 
Both accuse the soldiers of not keeping to their duties, of failing to wear their armour, duty spent in 
towns and disobedience.
355
 Fronto describes the legions as being corrupted by luxuria and 
lascivia.
356
 Herodian has Septimius Severus accuse the armies in the east of slackness and devotion 
to luxury (truphe).
357
 Luxuriousness can therefore be seen as a common literary device when 
writing of the Eastern army.  
The laxity of the Eastern legions should be regarded as a literary device used by ancient historians, 
possibly as a means of giving praise to the general who successfully restored discipline, as in the 
case of Lucullus in Plutarch, Corbulo in Tacitus and Lucius Verus in Fronto.
358
 It should be noted 
that Germanicus was accused by Piso of luxus in the East.
359
 In line with his disapproval of luxuria, 
Tacitus also placed significant emphasis on morality in the Annals and it is no accident that his 
account of the wars in the East takes place against a background of moral corruption in Rome.
360
 
Tacitus states: 
But the national morality (mores) which had fallen into oblivion was being overthrown from 
the foundations by this imported licentiousness; the aim of which was that every production 
of every land capable of undergoing or engendering corruption, should be on view in our 
capital, and that the youth, under the influence of foreign tastes should degenerate into 
votaries of the gymnasia, of indolence and of dishonourable amours, - and this at the 
instigation of the emperor and the senate.
361
  
Roman views rejected Greek gymnasia and games as a major threat to Roman morality and they 
characterised the gymnasia as making men soft.
362
 As examples of this decline into decay Tacitus 
depicts the situation of the illustrious family of the consul ordinarius of 58 Valerius Messalla who 
was now forced to rely on a pension of five hundred thousand sesterces from the emperor in order 
sustain a paupertatem innoxiam (blameless poverty) and his position in the state.
363
 Tacitus also 
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describes the same situation with the nobles Aurelius Cotta and Haterius Antoninus, whom he says 
lost their ancestral wealth through luxus.
364
  
It is not surprising then, in view of the moral corruption that Tacitus saw in Rome and the 
prevailing views of luxuria in the East, that the Eastern legions were described by Tacitus as being 
lax in every important aspect.
365
 Tacitus describes the soldiers as sluggish from long peace, ignorant 
of ditch and rampart, without arms or breastplates, sleek profiteers with their service spent in 
towns.
366
 Contact with towns was seen to be antithetical to a disciplined life.
367
 Corbulo, in contrast, 
is described as a stern disciplinarian who kept the men in tents in the harsh winter, but endured the 
appalling conditions with his men which was the sign of a good general.
368
 Here we have another 
instance of O‟Gorman‟s assertion of „the continual interplay of sometimes incompatible features, 
false appearance and hidden truth‟.369 The false appearance is the presumption of the luxus of the 
East and the hidden truth is the fact that the legions of the East faced a powerful enemy on its 
eastern border and could not afford to be lax. It appears that there was an expectation on the part of 
ancient readers to find that the Eastern legions always succumbed to luxury. The Romans appear to 
have believed that the East corrupted everything that came into contact with it.  
Given the ancient historiographical perspective on the luxury to be found in the East, it is not 
surprising that Tacitus focuses on the laxity of the legions in the Annals. It is noteworthy that 
Tacitus places the restoration of discipline to the disordered Eastern legions by Corbulo in 58.
370
 
Corbulo actually took control of the legions in 54-55.
371
 So was Corbulo dealing with seriously 
undisciplined legions for three or four years? This is impossible given the reputation that Tacitus 
has already established for Corbulo as a stern disciplinarian with the legions in Germany.
372
 In 58 
Tacitus records the sieges against Volandum and the capture of Artaxata, after Corbulo had 
disciplined the legions. It is notable that Tacitus describes the ardor (fervour) of the legions at 
Volandum in 58 after presenting them as ignavus (slothful) and in need of discipline in his account 
of the same year.
373
 It should be observed that a winter intervened between the discipline of the 
legions and the attack on Volandum, indicating a problem with the timing of the battle in Tacitus‟ 
account.
374
 This probably took place in 58 while the disciplining of the legions, if it had indeed been 
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necessary, could have taken place in any winter between 54 and 57/58.
375
 Tacitus says at Ann 13.9.3 
that he has linked the events of several consulships together, so in this respect he has again departed 
from his annalistic framework. Therefore Tacitus is clearly using this departure from his format and 
the topos of the laxity of the legions in the East to serve his literary agenda about the armies in the 
East. He has decided to emphasise the disorder of the legions in order to highlight the danger that 
the legions then faced. It is for this reason that Tacitus opens the chapter 13.35 with further action 
about to begin in 58 by describing the disorder in the Eastern legions.
376
 This gives a sense of 
urgency to the narrative: the general with his back to the wall, a war looming but the legions need to 
be brought under control before he can begin.
377
 This takes place against the spectacle in the next 
chapter of Tiridates invading Armenia.
378
 The disorder of the army at this point therefore could be 
considered a literary device meant to increase the drama of Corbulo‟s position and the alarming 
menace of the Parthians that he must face. The disorder of the legions in the East should therefore 
be regarded as a means of magnifying the achievements of an important general who restores 
discipline to the legions.
379
 
Tacitus‟ account of the Eastern legions is placed strategically in the Annals to contrast with events 
taking place in Rome. The campaign that begins with the march against Tiridates and the eventual 
capture of Artaxata and Tigranocerta is, as has been noted, placed in 58/59. The capture of Artaxata 
is mentioned in 60 when, according to Tacitus, Corbulo is planning his march on Tigranocerta. The 
period in between encompassed the death of Agrippina, the exile of the innocent Rubellius Plautus, 
who was descended from Augustus and Nero‟s descent into debauchery.380 The focus on the laxity 
of the Syrian legions in book thirteen was a way of reflecting the chaos that had occurred in Rome 
in the meantime. The eastern army had Corbulo to set it to rights. What hope had Rome?   
Therefore Tacitus‟ view of the corrupt state of Rome gave him the opportunity to underline 
Corbulo‟s excellence in the east.  Corbulo‟s eastern command also provided Tacitus with another 
opening to attack the senate with a charge of sycophancy.
381
 He describes the adulatio (fawning 
adulation) of the senate towards Nero as Corbulo‟s appointment to the east is announced.382 It 
meant according to Tacitus that a path to virtus (the virtues) had been opened. Tacitus‟ portrayal of 
the disciplined Corbulo is in exact contrast to the softness that he perceives in the senate and the 
oppressive adulation shown towards Nero on the occasion of a cessation of troubles in Armenia in 
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54.
383
 Corbulo is described by Tacitus as vetus and providus dux (a veteran and farsighted leader) 
who possesses sapientia and experientia (wisdom and experience).
384
  He shows patientia 
(tolerance) through the freezing winter in camp enduring it with his men exemplum omnibus (an 
example to all) and exhibits severitas (strictness) at all times.
 385
  This is the contrast that Tacitus 
makes between the competent leader, Corbulo, and his now disciplined legions and the situation in 
Rome.  
THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR 
In this section I analyse Tacitus‟ style and language in order to show that he employs the armies and 
the wars in the East to portray Corbulo as a vigilant and valiant general. On his arrival in the east, 
Corbulo was to receive his forces from Ummidius Quadratus, governor of Syria. The Syrian army 
was to be divided between Corbulo and the Syrian governor. Tacitus describes the disaffection 
between the two men, when Quadratus hurried to meet Corbulo in Cilicia instead of his own 
province, in case Corbulo‟s renown should attract unusual attention in Syria.386 Of the division of 
the legions between Ummidius Quadratus and Corbulo, Tacitus indicates in his use of language that 
he considers Corbulo the more important of the two. Tacitus merely says of Ummidius Quadratus 
that he remained with the two legions already in Syria.
387
 Of Corbulo however, Tacitus uses a more 
forceful dative of possession followed by an ablative absolute to explain corbulo‟s possession of the 
remaining armies.
388
 Tacitus‟ overall depiction of Ummidius Quadratus is of a weaker man than 
Corbulo who he describes as: corpore ingens, verbis magnificis et super experientiam 
sapientiamque (large in physique, a magnificent speaker in addition to his experience and 
wisdom).
389
 Tacitus particularly likes the term corpore ingens as he applies it to Caecina in the 
Histories and in the Annals to Plautus Lateranus and to Ostorius Scapula.
390
 Apart from Caecina, 
Tacitus uses these words in connection with men that he admired, as was the case with Lateranus 
who was an instigator of the Pisonian conspiracy, and Ostorius Scapula, who was sentenced to 
death by Nero.
391
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Tacitus‟ descriptions of Corbulo and the armies are in stark contrast to his later hostile description 
of Nero when he takes part in the Juvenile Games.
 392
 Nero is described as imperator by Tacitus, the 
normal title of a princeps victorious in battle, as he wins in the games. He appears as the frivolous 
imperator of the games as opposed to the dedicated dux leading his army to victories in the east. On 
the taking of Artaxata, Tacitus reports that Nero was hailed imperator which is possibly meant to be 
an ironic statement.
393
 As Mellor points out, Tacitus had a sense of humour, though it was often 
bitter and ironic.
394
 Tacitus is implying that the title of imperator no longer has meaning under this 
debauched princeps. Further it gave Tacitus the opportunity to portray C. Cassius making a 
sarcastic statement regarding the lavishness of the celebrations proposed in Rome.
395
 These were 
out of all proportion to the achievement, since Artaxata surrendered without a blow being struck.  
As Mellor has argued, sloth, debauchery and greed are used by Tacitus to link the moral failings of 
the imperial family and their supporters to the decline of freedom in Rome.
396
 While freedom was 
being limited in Rome by the exigencies of the emperor and the decline of morality which was 
antithetical to an ordered state, the army in the East was continuing to experience hardships to 
defend the state. Tacitus presents the reader with the renewed vigour of the army as opposed to the 
increasing corruption and injustice being perpetrated in Rome. Against the immorality and 
decadence that Tacitus sees there, he describes the hardships that Rome‟s troops were undergoing in 
the East on the march to take Artaxata. He describes the army‟s gruelling marches through the 
scorching heat and thirst of the Armenian summer. The army was reduced to a meat diet, unable to 
obtain grain, and water was scarce.
397
 There could not have been a greater contrast than that 
between the dissipation that Tacitus portrays in Rome and the gritty endurance of the army on its 
march. It was also another chance to show the general Corbulo as a hero, since he bore the 
deprivations with patience, suffering them with his men.
398
 After the battles of Tigranocerta and 
Legerda, Corbulo and the army were masters of Armenia and Rome then sent Tigranes to be their 
chosen king.
399
 At this point the war seems to be over.  
 
THE FINAL STAGES OF THE WAR. 
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In the middle stages of the war, Tacitus introduces Caesennius Paetus, a general sent by Rome to 
take over the care of Armenia from Corbulo. In every respect, Paetus is a foil for Corbulo. He is 
depicted as an arrogant, inefficient and neglectful general as opposed to the capable and energetic 
Corbulo. I will argue that Tacitus presents him also as the embodiment of the chaos in Rome by 
showing how his portrayal of this general‟s campaigns is reflected in Tacitus‟ account of Nero‟s 
reign as it unfolds in Rome. This will be done by examining Caesennius Paetus‟ role in the East and 
his devastating defeat at the hands of the Parthians, due to his abandonment of the care and caution 
that characterised Corbulo‟s successes.  
 
In 60 the governor of Syria, Ummidius Quadratus, had died and Corbulo was appointed to that 
governorship.
400
 A new point in the Romano-Parthian situation has been reached. There is no great 
celebration in Tacitus for Corbulo‟s achievements, no great words of victorious actions, just the 
simple statement that he was now the governor of Syria.
401
 Corbulo is depicted as a man who would 
rather have a war on hand than to wage one.
402
 Diplomacy was always an option for Corbulo. 
Tacitus describes Corbulo‟s attempts to persuade Tiridates to take his case for the Armenian throne 
to Nero, rather than fighting a war for it.
403
 It is clear from a reading of the Agricola that Tacitus 
preferred men who pursued an aggressive offensive policy such as that of Julius Agricola in Britain 
and Trajan in his own time. In any event, Rome‟s appointment of Tigranes to Armenia was a 
disaster, since he attacked the Parthian allied kingdom of Adiabene, thus refiring the war that 
Corbulo had finished. This gives Tacitus the means to introduce a foil for Corbulo in the person of 
Caesennius Paetus.
404
 Caesennius Paetus is given the same mandate that Corbulo had held with 
regard to Armenia and the legions are apportioned appropriately.  
The Parthian War plays a major role in book fifteen of the Annals. There are three major themes in 
book fifteen: the Parthian war in 15.1-17 and 24-31, the great fire of Rome in 15.34-41 and the 
Pisonian conspiracy from 15.48 to the end of the book. At the end of 15.18, Tacitus castigates the 
senate for setting up arches and trophies on the Capitoline Hill while the war in Armenia was still 
undecided. Tacitus is here again using the device of „false appearance and hidden truth‟.405 The 
armies of the East were still on alert, but the senators in Rome were celebrating as though the war 
was concluded. Corbulo continues the war after Caesennius Paetus‟ disastrous defeat against the 
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background of the fire in Rome and Nero‟s ever worse dissoluteness. Tacitus describes Nero‟s 
wedding to Pythagorus:  
 
„The veil was drawn over the imperial head, witnesses were despatched to the scene; the 
dowry, the marriage bed the nuptial torches were there: everything in short, which night 
enshrouds even if a woman was the bride.‟406 
 
 Again Tacitus brings the word imperator into disrepute. He depicts Nero as the debauched 
imperator of the wedding couch. Against this the work of Corbulo and the armies in the east stand 
out as a true mark of old Roman honour, the work of a true imperator. The disastrous great fire 
which Nero was suspected of lighting and the ineffective conspiracy of Piso „can thus be implicitly 
judged against the more reliable Corbulo and his eastern armies.‟407    
 
As a result of his unwise actions, Tigranes disappears from the scene. The events surrounding 
Tigranes‟ brief reign apparently covered the years 59 and 60 and are separated from the rest of 
Corbulo‟s campaigns since Tacitus saw them as an independent and futile pause in eastern 
affairs.
408
 Caesennius Paetus, consul ordinarius for 61 arrived in Syria in 62.
409
 Tacitus makes it 
immediately obvious that the two generals were unlikely to see eye to eye about the methods used 
to bring peace to Armenia.   Corbulo had used diplomacy where he could and war when necessary, 
and he aimed at putting a king approved by Roman on the throne of Armenia. Caesennius Paetus 
immediately made his aims clear:  
Paetus who would have had sufficient glory if he had been regarded as second to him 
[Corbulo], despised his achievements insisting that there had been no slaughter or plunder and 
that the storming of cities which he [Corbulo] frequently cited, were nominal only. He would 
impose on the vanquished taxes and laws and, instead of a mere shadow of a king, the 
jurisdiction of Rome.
410
 
Caesennius Paetus‟ words give the reader another view of Corbulo‟s achievements and one which 
they are not meant to believe.
 411
 It is true that no pitched battle was fought for Artaxata and that the 
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reader might find this disappointing, but Tacitus is again playing on the false appearance/reality 
contrast.
412
 The false appearance is Paetus‟ proposed actions, as against the reality, the fact that 
Nero had not necessarily changed his foreign policy to include what Paetus proposed to carry out in 
Armenia. Nero‟s later acceptance of Tiridates as client king of Armenia shows that Nero‟s policy 
had not changed. Moreover, the historian is setting the boastful general up for a devastating fall.  
This is the first inkling that Tacitus gives that things are going to go wrong. He follows this up with 
the ill omens that assail the armies of Paetus as they cross the Euphrates into Armenia, a device 
designed to further foreshadow the eventual humiliation that the general and his armies would 
endure at the hands of the Parthians.
413
 The cautious and diplomatic general, Corbulo, readied his 
armies to defend the Syrian frontier, lest the Parthians should be stirred by Paetus invasion of 
Armenia to attack his province of Syria.
414
 Thus Tacitus draws a fine portrait of the two 
commanding generals, one boastful and over-confident, ignoring even the ill omens and the other 
careful and provident, preparing for any eventuality. Once again Tacitus exposes the contrast 
between appearance and reality. The difference between the two commanders is a reflection of the 
disorder and decadence in Rome. Corbulo had restored order to the legions and pacified Armenia, 
and this was about to be throw into chaos again. The old order in Rome under Seneca and Burrus 
was gone and Nero was giving in to his vicious nature. Corbulo in the Annals is at no time involved 
in the politics in Rome, but his campaigns are a foil for them, as Caesennius Paetus is a foil for 
Corbulo himself while his campaigns invite comparison with the deteriorating situation in the res 
publica.  
Tacitus heralds Paetus‟ minor victories with the ominous sentence: „but Paetus, spurning the omens 
(spretis omnibus) his winter quarters still inadequately protected, and no provision made for his 
supply of grain‟.415 Here in the words spretis ominibus we have a stronger warning of impending 
doom for Paetus. Paetus‟ victories at Ann.15.8.1 therefore have a hollow ring, as he over-extends 
the area that the legions could control, and the supplies he that did have become contaminated. This 
is a fine contrast to Corbulo‟s care at Ann 13.39.1, when he was on the march and determined to 
secure his supply lines. Again, though Paetus had secured some victories we sense doom, as Tacitus 
treats the victories briefly and the words spretis ominibus are recalled to mind. Paetus‟ inattention to 
the basic needs of an army was the opposite of the military orderliness that Corbulo had established 
when he disciplined the legions on his arrival in the east. Again Tacitus produces a contrast between 
Corbulo and his orderly army as opposed to the image of the overconfident Paetus and his inability 
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to keep an army in order: the honour and care of one general and the alertness of his army as 
opposed to the boastful and careless of the other general. This is taking place at the time of the 
murder of Octavia, Nero‟s young wife, and Nero‟s marriage to Poppaea so that the disturbed 
situation in Rome is duplicated by Paetus‟ failings in the East.416 The contrast is made all the more 
obvious in Tacitus‟ account of the letter that Paetus sent to Rome indicating the war‟s completion. 
Tacitus writes that Paetus‟ letter held „magnificent words, empty of substance‟, using again the 
device of „false appearance and hidden truth‟ to highlight the picture he is giving of the incompetent 
general.
417
 For Tacitus the main thing to do is „to create disquiet with his language and to tease out 
the strands of uneasiness in his political and military discourse as a whole‟.418 Gilmartin writes that 
Tacitus does not laud Paetus‟ victories, though he does not condemn his stupidity either.419 This is 
not the case. Tacitus‟ negative view of Paetus is quiet clear in his language, though it is left to the 
reader to decipher the signs that Tacitus has given that this is no Corbulo. Thus the reader is left 
awaiting the denouement in the defeat at Rhandeia.
420
 In Paetus‟ letter to Nero, Tacitus uses the 
same words that featured in his admiring description of Corbulo at Ann.13.8.3, a comparison that 
stresses Paetus‟ culpability.421 Gilmartin writes: „Corbulo‟s magnificence was founded on real 
accomplishments, but Tacitus‟ narrative demonstrates clearly that Paetus‟ were not.‟422  
In describing Paetus early campaign in Armenia, Tacitus depicts him as indecisive, and dangerously 
so. Tacitus shows Paetus‟ fondness for rhetoric when he writes: „he cried that he had not been given 
ditch or rampart, but bodies and arms to fight the enemy.‟423 This was probably what the reader in 
Rome would have expected of a commander in a story, a great set battle where gloria was won by 
Rome‟s armies. But Paetus could not stand up to the enemy and retreated, so his shame is 
contrasted again with the armies of Corbulo. Corbulo on the other hand had been busy reinforcing 
Syria by building a bridge across the Euphrates and establishing a fort there in the face of the 
enemy. Tacitus contrasts the active but unsuccessful war of Paetus with the psychological warfare 
of Corbulo who was making a feint into the very heartland of the Parthians. In 62 Paetus was 
soundly defeated by the Parthians and went into all out retreat, before Corbulo could arrive to aid 
him.
424
 Tacitus presents the rhetoric of both Paetus and Corbulo as the two generals met after the 
retreat: Paetus wanted to unite the two armies and retake Armenia, but Corbulo said that he had no 
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such orders from Nero. Tacitus shows that Corbulo knew what was possible and had Syria to care 
for. Paetus had failed dismally and returned to Rome in disgrace.
425
 
 
The campaigns of Corbulo and Paetus take up most of Tacitus‟ narrative for the year 62. However, 
the little that is written on Roman affairs in that year is unsettling. Tacitus recounts the murders of 
Cornelius Sulla and Rubellius Plautus who Nero believed were his rivals, and the death of Nero‟s 
young wife Octavia.
426
 The defeat of Paetus in Armenia is noted in combination with these murders, 
and the only ray of light in this dramatic narrative is that Corbulo is given his maius imperium equal 
to that of Pompey against the pirates to restore order to Armenia.
427
 It is ironic that Paetus had used 
Pompey‟s name in his futile argument with Tiridates, while penned in his fortress in Armenia.428 
Corbulo was not only required to undertake the war against Armenia, but to restore Rome‟s 
reputation. C. Cestius was assigned the governorship of Syria and Corbulo was in command of all 
the armed forces. Rome itself was in turmoil, but Armenia could be saved. This is the dichotomy 
with which Tacitus presents us, potential peace in the east and increasing chaos in Rome. The 
triumph of Corbulo over Paetus represents once again the superior generalship of Corbulo 
compared to the debauched imperator Nero. 
 
Tacitus ends the year 63 with the submission of the Parthians to Corbulo and an agreement that 
Tiridates receive his crown from Nero. This is brought about by diplomacy on the part of Corbulo 
who, in his negotiations with Tiridates, compares the instability of the Parthian empire as against 
the peaceful empire of Nero.
429
 This is a fine piece of rhetoric on Tacitus‟ part as he contrasts the 
two empires: one, the Parthian empire, riddled with internal dissention and the other, apart from 
Nero‟s antics in Rome, largely at peace. Tacitus portrays a glorious scene with the legions drawn up 
to accept Tiridates‟ submission. Tacitus says that the legions stood with glittering eagles 
(fulgentibus aquilis) and standards, a stark contrast to his description of them at Ann.13.35-36. All 
suggestion of laxity is gone; the legions can stand proudly in their hour of victory. From the first 
appearance of Corbulo and the disciplining of his legions to the submission of Tiridates in 63 
Tacitus presents a comparison between the legions and their campaigns in the east and the 
increasing corruption in Rome. Order is finally brought to Armenia with a Roman nominated king 
on the throne, but in Rome the madness continues and even escalates. Tacitus has utilised the 
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armies of the east as a literary device to highlight what he saw as the turmoil in Rome and the 
debauchery inherent in the reign of Nero.  
CONCLUSION 
The spread of luxuria that had once infected the eastern legions had in, in Tacitus‟ view, corrupted 
the Roman state and was the source of the canker that now lay at its heart. The various segments of 
Corbulo‟s war against Parthia (the res externae) are structured so they form a counterpoint to the 
troubled events in Rome. Tacitus shows that the arrogant and untalented Caesennius Paetus is a foil 
for both the careful Corbulo and the decay in Rome, with its servile senate and its vicious emperor. 
The disorder in the Parthian ruling house also echoes the disorder in Rome and the Parthians 
inability to overcome the Eastern legions is a reflection of Rome‟s inability to overcome the rot that 
had set in under Nero. With the legions in the East in fact, Tacitus provides us with a foil for the 
situation that he saw in Rome, which would not have the successful outcome that the Eastern 
campaigns did.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ARMY IN THE CITY OF ROME 
   
Throughout the Annals Tacitus refers to the troops of the Praetorian Guard simply as „soldiers‟ 
(milites) giving the impression that an army, which was forbidden within Rome itself, was in effect 
present in form of the cohorts of the Praetorian Guard. He gives many accounts of the actions of the 
Praetorian Guard, under the direction of the princeps, as assassins, intimidators and potential threats 
to the general populace and to the lives of the leading citizens of Rome. Also Tacitus uses the 
Praetorian prefects to reflect his own views of the emperors themselves. His discussion of the 
careers of Tiberius‟ Praetorian Prefect Aelius Sejanus and Nero‟s Prefect Ofonius Tigellinus are 
covered in undisguised animosity, since they are portrayed, not only as the Guard commanders but 
also as these emperors‟ accomplices in their vices. This chapter will discuss Tacitus‟ treatment of 
the Praetorian Guard and the Praetorian Prefects in the Annals with a view to determining how his 
portrayal is a reflection on the emperors‟ characters. 
 
THE SOLDIERS OF THE PRAETORIAN GUARD 
On the whole Tacitus depicts the Guard as loyal to the princeps and Tacitus employs the Praetorian 
Guard to reveal key aspects of Tiberius‟ character. The first to swear allegiance to Tiberius on 
Augustus‟ death were the consuls and the Praetorian Prefect Aelius Strabo, father of the later 
prefect Sejanus.
430
 The Praetorian Prefect swore allegiance even before the senators, demonstrating 
that the relationship between emperor and prefect was a close one.
431
 As Tacitus reports, the 
principate came about as in the old Republic through the consuls, though it is obvious that he sees 
the presence of the Prefect of the Guard as significant to the power of the new princeps, and the 
Guard as the representation of the power.
432
  Tacitus states that at first Tiberius was unwilling to 
accept the office of princeps and even when he summoned the senators to the curia, he only 
„headed it with the tribunician power received under Augustus.‟433 Tacitus then goes on to condemn 
Tiberius for giving the watchword to the Praetorian Guard, and being accompanied to the forum and 
the curia by soldiers.
434
 Here Tacitus presents us with the image of an army imposed on the senate 
and people, the consequence, as he saw it, of the principate.  Tacitus portrays Tiberius as having the 
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trappings of a court, kingship of course being the thing that Romans hated above all else.
435
 This 
may have been in Tacitus‟ mind with his very opening sentence: „Rome at the outset was ruled by 
kings.‟436 Tacitus is using Tiberius‟ interaction with the Praetorian Guard to imply that Tiberius was 
a dissembler before the senate, eager for the principate though saying otherwise while he was 
actively working with the Praetorian Guard in the forum and the curia.
437
 The idea that Tacitus is 
exploring here is the hypocrisy of Tiberius‟ seeming on the one hand to hesitate about taking on the 
role of Augustus, whilst at the same time being in control of the forces of domination.  
A brief look at Augustus funeral is necessary for an understanding of Tacitus‟ perception of the 
Praetorian Guard at the old princeps‟ death. It contributes to Tacitus‟ negative depiction of Tiberius. 
Tacitus relates that the Praetorians stood as if a garrison at the funeral of Augustus:  
to the derision of those who had personally seen or who had heard from their parents about 
that day of still undigested servitude (servitii) and of freedom (libertatis) served up again  
unsuccessfully. Now they said, an elderly princeps, despite the longevity of his power, and 
having even provided the state with resources in the form of heirs, would evidently require 
protecting by military assistance to ensure that his burial was peaceful.
438
 
Of course there is nothing sinister about Augustus being honoured by a garrison of the Guard at his 
funeral since he was their founder. Tacitus, however, has presented the thoughts of the crowd as a 
condemnation of the presence of the Guard at the funeral. This shows the way in which Tacitus is 
working as a historian, choosing what to include and what to leave out as he only gives a negative 
opinion of the Guard in his account, representing them as a force inflicted on the people of Rome. 
Of considerable interest is Tacitus‟ use of the words servitii and libertatis in this context. Tacitus 
used the word servitium also at the accession of Tiberius when he wrote that the consuls, senators 
and equestrians rushed into servitude.
439
 The nostalgic dream of the Republic meant libertas. The 
system of the principate did not, but rather meant servitium.
440
 Tacitus sees the Praetorian Guard as 
the instrument of that servitium. This is illustrated by the ridiculous tale of the grovelling Haterius. 
He almost tripped Tiberius while attempting to plead for forgiveness for words he had said in the 
senate and was nearly killed by Tiberius‟ guard.441 This was a minor incident in itself, but one that 
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Tacitus felt obliged to record in order to show the power that was at Tiberius‟ command through the 
Praetorian Guard.  In another instance in 33 Tiberius asked the senate to approve that Macro, a few 
tribunes and centurions should be permitted to go with him whenever he entered the curia.
442
 
Tacitus reports that the senate then passed the motion „lavishly‟(largus) and without regard to the 
number of Tiberius‟ guard.443 In writing this way, Tacitus is showing the senate at its most 
subservient, especially since Tiberius never again came to the city at all much less the curia. 
Through incidents such as these, Tacitus expresses his disgust of the senate that, from the 
beginnings of the principate, expressed no dissent to that office and thus allowed servitium to 
grow.
444
 
 On a number of occasions Tacitus represents the Praetorian Guard as the intimidators and assassins 
of the princeps. In 14 they put to death Sempronius Gracchus, the onetime lover of Augustus‟ 
daughter Julia.
445
 Intimidation by the Guard is also shown when, in 16, Libo Drusus was being 
tried. He was accused of consulting astrologers with reference to the princeps though in truth it was 
probably treason.
446
 The young man‟s house was surrounded by soldiers at his last banquet.447 
Owing to the serious nature of the charges against Drusus, which Tacitus makes no attempt to 
justify, Tacitus does not seem to be implying that there was anything wrong with the soldiers being 
there. However he establishes that it was their oppressive presence that occasioned his suicide.
448
 
Tacitus writes:  
Meanwhile his house was picketed by soldiers; they were tramping in the portico itself, within 
eyeshot and earshot, when Libo, thus tortured at the very feast that was to be his last delight 
on earth called for a slayer.
 449
 
Similar intimidation was brought to bear by a tribune of the Praetorian Guard on Calpurnius Piso, 
who was accused of fomenting civil war and causing Germanicus‟ death. The tribune escorted him 
home from the curia during his trial and the result was Piso‟s suicide a day later.450 Tacitus is 
delightfully ambiguous here as he writes: „while the rumour debated whether the escort was there 
for the preservation of his life or the enforcement of his death.‟451 Haynes suggests that „an easily 
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identifiable characteristic of Tacitus‟ work is the way in which he reports what people have said.‟452 
Tacitus often employed rumour or popular opinion to express ideas when he did not actually wish to 
make an accusation.
453
 Tacitus has thus used rumour here to focus on the equivocal aspects that he 
perceived in the actions of the Praetorian Guard with regard to Piso. Calpurnius Piso was, Tacitus 
claims, Tiberius‟ colleague in his actions against Germanicus in the east. However, Tacitus utilised 
Tiberius‟ apparent aloofness in the case of Piso‟s death to portray Tiberius ambiguously: did he 
approve of Piso‟s death or was he grieved at the loss of a colleague? It is left to the reader to decide. 
Since the princeps was in control of the guard, the suggestion is the former, but Tacitus‟ mode of 
writing leads the reader to believe the latter.  
The death of Drusus, the son of Germanicus gives another view of the Praetorian Guard as a symbol 
of domination. The Praetorian centurion Attius sent a letter to the senate.
454
                                                                                                                                                                                           
It detailed the centurion‟s own brutal treatment of Drusus and recorded Drusus‟ words at the time of 
his imprisonment and starvation at the orders of Tiberius. Tacitus has the dying Drusus curse 
Tiberius and charge him with murdering his daughter in law, his brother‟s son and grandsons. Here 
Tacitus does not fall shy of directly accusing Tiberius, though he puts the words in the mouth of the 
dying man. This is another instance of Tacitus using the words of another to express his own views 
of Tiberius.
455
 Tacitus portrays Tiberius as acting directly against his own family, openly displaying 
his autocracy in placing his nobly born grandson under the lash of a centurion (sub verbere 
centurionis), denying him the rights of a Roman citizen.
456
  The description of the Praetorian 
centurion‟s actions clearly demonstrates the power that Tacitus saw in the princeps’ use of the 
Praetorian Guard. 
The return of the ashes of Germanicus to Rome and his funeral presented Tacitus with the 
opportunity of using the Praetorian Guard to show Tiberius in an abstruse fashion. Tiberius had sent 
two cohorts of the Praetorian Guard to Calabria to take charge of Germanicus‟ ashes, and these 
were borne on the shoulders of tribunes and centurions.
457
 But his sending of the Guard is 
represented by Tacitus as a false sign of Tiberius‟ and the Augusta‟s grief, since Tacitus writes: 
„everyone was aware that the delight of Tiberius at Germanicus‟ death was being badly 
dissembled.‟458 He goes on to say: 
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Tiberius and Augusta refrained from public appearance deeming it would belittle their 
sovereignty to lament openly or lest, with everyone‟s eyes examining their demeanour, their 
falsity be understood.
459
  
Further, Tiberius is denigrated by Tacitus‟ assertion that he limited the time for mourning for 
Germanicus.
460
 This, in Tacitus‟ words, did not reflect the attitude of the Praetorian Guard. 
According to Tacitus, the soldiers wandered the street under arms after the arrival at Rome of 
Germanicus‟ ashes. Along with the general public and magistrates, who were not wearing their 
insignias, Tacitus presents them as mourning and shouting that the state had collapsed and no hope 
remained.
461
 Tacitus is presenting a picture of disorder with the magistrates and the people and even 
the Guards wandering in panic.
462
  It is notable that the Praetorian Guardsmen were under arms 
which would have been appropriate for the Guard attending Germanicus‟ obsequies. The 
Praetorians usually went togate to hide their weapons.
463
 The fact that the guards are under arms 
helps to bring a sense of the menace to the panic that Tacitus has already presented. Tacitus then, 
utilises the Praetorian Guard during the reign of Tiberius to depict the servitude of the populace and 
the senate to an autocratic emperor. Tacitus envisions the emperor employing the Guard to murder 
and intimidate the people in order to limit their libertas. In this way Tacitus brings an impression of 
malevolence to a rule that he obviously despises. 
 
The Praetorian Guard features prominently in the Claudian narrative as a way of underlining the 
power and influence that Agrippina the Younger could acquire under a princeps that Tacitus 
considered weak.  Agrippina serves as a symbol of female interference with the Praetorian Guard 
since Tacitus depicts her as courting the acceptance of the Praetorians, just as her mother had 
gained the loyalty of the legions in Germany.
464
 In 50 Ostorius gained a great victory over 
Caratacus in Britain and captured Caratacus and his family who he brought to Rome. Thereafter, 
Agrippina appears in a prominent role in the presence of the prisoners. Claudius, revelling in the 
success of the army, had the Praetorians parade in armour and had the prisoners brought before him. 
Tacitus reports that Agrippina was also present on a tribunal as „a conspicuous figure‟ (conspicuam) 
and that the prisoners rendered her the same honour and praise that they gave to the emperor 
himself.
465
 According to Tacitus, it was an innovation that a woman should sit in state before 
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Roman standards, but he implies that it was earned: „but she was presenting herself as a partner in 
the command once won by her ancestors.‟466 Agrippina had already been shown in the glory of her 
descendants: „Agrippina, born of Germanicus‟ (Iuliam Agrippinam Germanico genitam.)467 
Certainly, Agrippina was ambitious enough to assert her influence beside that of her aging husband. 
Tacitus further highlights Agrippina‟s ambition when he depicts her ingratiating herself with the 
Praetorian Guard who took a major role in the mock naval battle given by Claudius. The emperor 
wore a military cape as he presided over the battle, attended and aided by the Praetorians. Agrippina 
however appeared with him dressed in a chlamys, a cloak more suitable to a member of the 
military.
468
  
Tacitus‟ depiction of Agrippina‟s influence over the Guard is in line with his general view that 
Claudius was ruled by his wives and freedmen, a dominant theme of the Claudian books of the 
Annals.
469
 Tacitus gives further evidence that Agrippina had influence over the Praetorian Guard 
when centurions and tribunes who showed too much sympathy for Britannicus were removed for 
what Tacitus tells us were fabricated reasons.
470
 Tacitus does not directly accuse Agrippina of this, 
but it can be assumed, as at the beginning of the next chapter, she is shown acting to remove the two 
Praetorian prefects, Lusius Geta and Rufrius Crispinus, and having them replaced by Afranius 
Burrus.
471
 Her reasons were that these two prefects had been bound to Messalina and might be loyal 
to her children and Tacitus uses this to highlight the division of loyalties that appears to exist in the 
Praetorian Guard between Agrippina and the house of Claudius. 
In his account of the reign of Nero, Tacitus employs again the Praetorian Guard to reveal the darker 
aspects of Nero‟s character. The theme of military dominance is constantly present, as it is in the 
reigns of Tiberius and Claudius. It is notable that when Nero succeeded Claudius and was taken to 
the Guards‟ camp to be acclaimed, some of the Guards asked for Britannicus instead.472 The Guard 
here is presented in the role of king-maker, since it shows the loyalties that could develop towards 
individual members of the imperial family under the principate. It also shows the power that Tacitus 
saw in the Guard, the fact that it was necessary for a new princeps to gain its acceptance. The 
emperor‟s use of the Praetorian Guard as agents of domination is indicated after the divorce of 
Octavia, when Nero, in fear of the populace briefly brought her back.
473
 The public rioted and 
carried images of Octavia wreathed in flowers. Guards were dispatched to disperse the crowds by 
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beatings and with the sword, surely an act of barbarism in the city of Rome.
474
 Tacitus here depicts 
Nero in a malignant light, along with the soldiers of the Guard who, with Nero, have acted against 
will of the people. 
The death of Octavia is shown with great pathos. Tacitus‟ account of the dreadful fate of the 
innocent young girl and her maids at the hands of the Praetorians is meant to be unsettling. As 
Tacitus says of this event: 
 Gifts were decreed to the temples for this; and how long shall I be recalling them? Whoever 
becomes acquainted with the misfortunes of those times, either through my authorship or that 
of others, may hold the presumption that whenever the princeps ordered exile and slaughter, 
on every occasion, gratitude was expressed to the gods, and that what were once the 
distinctions of success were now those of public disaster. And yet we shall not be silent if any 
senate‟s decision was novel in its sycophancy or unsurpassable in its passivity.475 
In the death of Octavia, Tacitus is showing the Praetorians as assassins of the worse kind, but 
Tacitus makes it clear that their actions also reflect badly on Nero and Poppaea, as Octavia‟s head 
was brought to Rome for Poppaea to see.
476
 Once again Tacitus expresses his disgust with the 
senate for what he characterises as their servitium.
477
 
The reign of Nero gives Tacitus further opportunities to portray the Praetorian Guard in 
contradictory ways. For the most part Tacitus writes in the same negative fashion of the Praetorian 
Guard being agents of the princeps‟ domination. In Tacitus‟ account, the Guards accompanying the 
emperor to the theatre in Neapolis where he was to perform, received donatives after the Pisonian 
conspiracy and beat the crowd when they failed to clap in unison at one of Nero‟s performances.478 
By contrast, Tacitus then relates the courageous behaviour of the tribunes, centurions and troops 
who took part in the Pisonian Conspiracy and were executed for it.
479
 One tribune, Subrius Flavus, 
when asked by Nero before his execution why he had taken part in the conspiracy, replied: 
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 I hated you, and yet none of your soldiers was more loyal to you as long as you deserved 
affection. I began to hate you only after you turned out be the parricide of your mother and 
wife, a charioteer and an actor and an arsonist.
480
 
 Tacitus says that these were the man‟s own words, recorded by him, because he believed that it was 
fitting that a military man‟s feelings should become known.481 It is notable that Cassius Dio records 
Flavus as making only two charges, that of charioteer and lyre player.
482
  Therefore Tacitus‟ having 
Flavus make four charges against Nero may be viewed as a literary device by Tacitus to show his 
own opinion of Nero. Also, such an episode, blending the real and the dramatic would have 
appealed to Tacitus‟ readers. Tacitus shows that while Nero could rely upon some of the Guard and 
the Praetorian Prefect, some at least of the Guardsmen were disaffected. 
On the whole, Tacitus manipulates the Praetorian Guard in order to depict it as the emperor‟s 
instrument of domination and brutality.
483
 This is clearly visible in the Tiberian Hexad, and in the 
surviving books of Claudius which show the influence of Agrippina on the Guard. The theme of 
brutality in the Tiberian Hexad appears again throughout the reign of Nero, with Tigellinus as 
Prefect. In view of the evidence, it is clear that Tacitus sees the Praetorian Guard as a reflection of 
the emperors under whom they served. 
 
THE PRAETORIAN PREFECTS 
The Praetorian Prefecture up until the time of Sejanus was chiefly an administrative post held by 
men of equestrian rank and not necessarily of high military calibre.
484
 They were certainly not 
career military men.
485
 This is definitely the case with Sejanus, Burrus and Tigellinus. None had 
had a distinguished military career and all came to the Prefecture of the Guard from relatively 
modest beginnings.
486
 The Prefecture was however a post of potentially great power, since once 
appointed, the Prefect became a member of the emperor‟s consilium.487 The Praetorian Prefect in 
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the Annals appears chiefly as an agent of the imperial system. Tacitus uses the appointment of a 
new Praetorian Prefect as a literary device to indicate different stages in each emperor‟s reign. Each 
of the principes had one Prefect that Tacitus depicts as a major influence in his rule: Aelius Sejanus 
under Tiberius, Afranius Burrus under Claudius and Nero, and Ofonius Tigellinus under Nero. 
Sejanus and Tigellinus are depicted in a very hostile light and are shown as having a malign 
influence on Tiberius and Nero, encouraging their vices. Burrus on the other hand is shown as a 
moderate and good servant of the state, probably because of his association with Seneca, whom 
Tacitus admired. The Praetorian Prefect had not, until the reign of Tiberius been a high level 
official. However an investigation of the role played by the Prefects of the Guard in the Annals 
brings to light Tacitus‟ views on the principate through the princeps’ dependence on these officials. 
In the Annals they had grown in importance and had become involved in affairs of state. The 
emperors, as Tacitus represents them, came to rely on these men to an unprecedented degree.  
Sejanus is introduced in the beginning of book four as being the embodiment of vice, and Tacitus 
claims that he had sold illicit sex to Apicius.
488
  Tacitus goes on to say that Sejanus had soon 
shackled Tiberius by these nefarious arts.
489
 Tacitus accuses Sejanus of increasing the prestige of 
the Prefecture of the Praetorian Guard, which he says had until that time been limited, by placing 
the Guard in one camp.
490
 It is interesting to note that while Cassius Dio places the building of the 
camp in 20, Tacitus delays the date of the camp to 23, in order to more closely connect it with his 
account of the rise of Sejanus.
491
 This dating of the establishment of the Praetorian Camp increases 
the impact of the appearance of Sejanus at the beginning of book four.  
Tacitus reports that Sejanus aspired to a bond with the imperial house in the form of a marriage with 
Livia the widow of Drusus, whom he had had poisoned.
492
 The views of Tacitus and Velleius 
Paterculus regarding Sejanus are comparable. However, while Tacitus is writing in a condemnatory 
fashion in relation to the proposed marriage, Velleius Paterculus is writing in an admiring fashion 
about Sejanus who was his contemporary. Tacitus uses similar words to Velleius Paterculus in his 
description of Sejanus‟ letter to Tiberius asking for permission to marry Livia: „he would rather 
stand sentry and work… for the security of the emperor‟ (excubias ac labores…pro incolumitate 
imperatoris malle).
493
 Velleius writes: „He himself combined loyalty to his master with great 
capacity for labour‟ (ipsum vero laboris ac fidei capacissimum).494 In Tacitus these words are 
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designed to be hypocritical and derogatory while in Velleius Paterculus they are admiring. 
Similarly, Tacitus says that he was impelled by industry and vigilance (industria et vigilantia), 
while Velleius sees him as always alert (animo exsomnem).
495
 While Velleius is admiring, Tacitus‟ 
conclusion is that these qualities only served to help Sejanus aim at kingship (regno).
496
  
Sejanus is portrayed more in the political arena than in his capacity as the Prefect of the Praetorian 
Guard. Therefore Tacitus uses this political interference in order to give a negative view of Sejanus 
and Tiberius. Tacitus uses strong words to describe Sejanus‟ power. He uses the word potentia, 
rather than potestas.
497
 Champlin notes that Tacitus uses potentia five times with reference to 
Sejanus.
498
 Velleius Paterculus and Sallust use potentia in the sense of gaining great power, while 
Velleius Paterculus and Caesar use potestas in the sense of the authority to hold great power.
499
 
Sejanus certainly gained great power, and Tacitus‟ malevolent use of the word potentia is 
appropriate to his attitude towards Sejanus. It is more appropriate than potestas, which implies the 
constitutional right to hold power, which of course Sejanus did not have. However despite this 
power, there seems to be little interaction between Sejanus and the Praetorian Guard in the Annals. 
Tacitus portrays Sejanus as acting in his own interests and apart from the one instance when he puts 
the Guard into the single camp, a move which Tacitus sees as sinister, Sejanus appears to be 
divorced from the Guard itself. Certainly in the early years of the prefecture, the office was 
administrative and did not have the powers that it developed in the later empire.
500
  Sejanus had no 
great military career that we know of and was not even a senator until he was made consul, a move 
that would have rankled with Tacitus and may explain his undisguised animosity towards 
Sejanus.
501
 In Tacitus‟ view, Sejanus was an undistinguished man, who did not reach the senate by 
the normal route. Tacitus emphasises Sejanus‟ unworthiness for his office because he embodies the 
ability of unsuitable men to gain influence under the principate.
502
 The account of Sejanus in 
Tacitus is centred on Sejanus‟ moves towards potentia, firstly his gaining the confidence of the 
emperor and later his consulship with Tiberius without his ever having sat in the senate. Indeed, 
Champlin believes that Sejanus, in holding his consulship with Tiberius saw himself as Tiberius‟ 
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and Drusus.
503
 In addition, according to Tacitus, the only way for another man to gain the 
consulship was through Sejanus.
504
 Tacitus would have perceived this as another evil of the 
principate. Tiberius‟ reliance on a man who Tacitus regarded as an upstart, a man who had not 
reached the consulship through the cursus honorum and was now the means of obtaining 
magistracies, was  anathema to Tacitus. 
Sejanus‟ victims are not neglected by Tacitus either. Tacitus uses Sejanus‟ disposal of these victims 
to highlight his picture of the dominance of the Praetorian prefect. This, according to Tacitus, came 
about through Sejanus‟ influence over Tiberius.505  One example shall suffice. In the beginning of 
28, the illustrious equestrian Titus Sabinus, friend of Germanicus and continuing friend of his 
family, was dragged to prison. He was attacked by three men, one of whom was Latinius Latiarus. 
The men were seeking the consulship, through Sejanus.
506
 Pretending sympathy, Latiarus had lured 
Sabinus into unwise accusations against Sejanus, his savagery (saevitiam), his haughtiness 
(superbiam) and his ambitions (spes), while the other two listened secretly as witnesses.
507
 The 
alliteration of the hissing series the letter „s‟ in this passage (audientius iam onerat Seianum, 
saevitiam, superbiam spes eius) give the impression of the helpless anger with which the words are 
forced from Sabinus.  The result was his denunciation. As he was dragged to prison he shouted that 
such were the year‟s inaugurations, these were Sejanus victims that were being felled in sacrifice.508 
The overall impression Tacitus gives is one of Sejanus‟ overweening power. 
Tacitus presents another victim of Sejanus, Agrippina the Elder, as a contrast to Sejanus, „his 
counterbalance‟.509 Tacitus gives an account of how Sejanus warned Agrippina that Tiberius 
planned to poison her at a dinner party, of how he set the Guards to report on Agrippina‟s private 
conversations with her son, Nero in order to incriminate them, and used the Guards to set Drusus 
against his brother Nero.
510
 In book four Agrippina is seen as promoting the interests of her sons 
while Sejanus is promoting his own career, and the ruin of Agrippina and her family is part of his 
plans.
511
 Tacitus presents a contrast between Agrippina and Sejanus throughout book four, where 
Sejanus is seen as dissimulating and Agrippina is the opposite, loudly expressing her thoughts.
 512
 
There are also the requests of both Sejanus and Agrippina to Tiberius asking that they be permitted 
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to marry. Both were refused, though Sejanus was later successful in marrying Livia‟s (Livilla‟s) 
daughter. Sejanus‟ malign influence is brutally shown by Tacitus in the incidents of the betrayal and 
condemnation of Agrippina and her sons. 
Tacitus sees Sejanus as aiming at the principate and relates what he believed were Sejanus‟ 
intentions: „there were sometimes lavishing and luxuriousness, but more often industry and 
vigilance, no less harmful when they are aimed at kingship.‟513 In addition Tacitus shows Sejanus‟ 
unctuousness towards Tiberius in order to achieve his own ends. In the letter that Sejanus wrote to 
Tiberius asking for permission to marry Livia, Sejanus claimed that it was customary for him to 
take his hopes and prayers not primarily to the gods but to Tiberius.
514
 As Pelling argues, Tiberius 
was not a god, but the suggestion here is that the princeps was presented by Sejanus as a sort of 
divine equivalent.
515
 This would not have sat comfortably with Tacitus or with many other 
aristocratic Romans for that matter.  Sejanus claimed in this letter that he never pleaded for the 
glitter of honours.
516
 In Tacitus, this is at variance with Sejanus‟ aspirations to become a member of 
the ruling family by this marriage. He had already held the consulship in partnership with Tiberius, 
and was now aiming higher. In Sejanus‟ claims that he was not aiming at honours, one is reminded 
of Tiberius at his accession being reluctant to take on the role of princeps.
517
 Tacitus found this 
false in Tiberius and he obviously relates the letter of Sejanus with similar disbelief. Because of his 
negative interpretation of the career of the Prefect Sejanus, Tacitus‟ treatment of the Praetorian 
Guard during his account of Tiberius‟ reign is indicative of deceit and dominance over the people 
and senate of Rome. However, Tiberius is implicated by Tacitus in the deeds of Sejanus, thus 
adding to the overall hostile view that Tacitus gives of this emperor.
518
  
We now turn to the reign of Claudius which is divided into two parts in the surviving portions of the 
Annals: the influence of Messalina in book eleven and then the influence of Agrippina from book 
twelve onwards. The change in wives precipitated a change in Praetorian Prefects, since Agrippina 
removed the commanders who were sympathetic to her predecessor.
519
 This may also be said of the 
Praetorian Prefects since they appear at the same defining moments. In the surviving books of 
Claudius‟ reign, the Praetorian Prefects are initially presented in such a way as to imply that they 
were more sympathetic to Messalina than to Claudius. Tacitus records that in 51, Agrippina 
engineered the removal of Lusius Geta and Rufrius Crispus, who had been Praetorian Prefects 
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during Claudius‟ marriage to Messalina, because she believed that they were loyal to the memory of 
Messalina and would adhere to her children.
520
 At Messalina‟s fall, Tacitus writes: „implicit 
confidence was not felt in the Praetorian commandant Geta, who veered with equal levity to the 
good and to the evil.‟521 The result was that Claudius was convinced to place the Guard into the 
hands of his freedman Narcissus for one day. Tacitus seems to accept that this was necessary under 
the circumstances, but states when Narcissus was rewarded with the decorations of quaestorship 
that this was „the merest triviality for one so disdainful, since he acted above Pallas and 
Callistus.‟522 Tacitus uses strong words here (levissimum fastidii) which can have the sense of 
something having little force or validity, and of causing disgust.
523
 This language expresses his 
antipathy at a lowborn man gaining high rank undeservedly. It is his way of showing his own 
aversion to the elevation of a freedman not only to the Prefecture of the Guard, but also to his 
reception of the quaestorian insignia. The dismissal of the two prefects Rufrius Crispinus and 
Lusius Geta paved the way for the elevation of Afranius Burrus to the sole prefecture in 51.
 524
  
Tacitus sees in Afranius Burrus a worthy and loyal servant of the state, possibly due to Burrus‟ 
close association with Seneca, whom he admired.
525
 However Tacitus uses the appointment of 
Burrus to highlight the power of Agrippina over Claudius, since it was at her insistence that Burrus 
was promoted to the prefecture.
526
 Although Tacitus despises Sejanus as an unworthy man 
achieving high office under Tiberius, he is careful that no word of unworthiness attaches to Burrus 
who in effect had had no greater career than Sejanus.
527
 This is in spite of the fact that Afranius 
Burrus was from Vasio in Narbonensis and Tacitus often shows his dark side when dealing with 
men from Narbonensis and Spain.
528
 Tacitus further demonstrates his admiration for the Prefect 
when he writes that Seneca and Burrus were the „guides‟ (rectores) of the emperor Nero‟s youth.529 
This mirrors what Tacitus says about Sejanus as „a guide (rector) to the young Drusus.‟ 530 
O‟Gorman argues that this serves to insinuate that Seneca and Burrus almost threaten to supersede 
their pupil, since Sejanus‟ later relationship with Drusus, son of Tiberius, was not as a guide but as 
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a rival.
531
 This is a fair statement, as Tacitus notes that Seneca and Burrus were helping each other 
so that they might more easily manage Nero.
532
 Tacitus‟ characterisation of Burrus is valuable in 
that firstly it shows his high opinion of Burrus and secondly that it highlights the close association 
of Burrus and Seneca and their intimacy with the young Nero.
533
 Tacitus‟ depiction of the close 
association of these two men and Nero is at variance with the factionalism that Tacitus shows in the 
reign of Claudius between the adherents of Agrippina and those of Claudius himself. Of the 
beginning of Nero‟s reign, Tacitus writes:  
These guides [Burrus and Seneca] of the Commander‟s youth were mutually harmonious, a 
rarity in an alliance of power, and equally forceful by different means, Burrus in military 
concerns and the severity of his behaviour, Seneca in his precepts for eloquence and an 
honourable affability, each helping the other so that they might more easily retain their hold 
on the slipperiness of the princeps‟ age by permitting him pleasures if he spurned virtue.534 
When Nero conceived a passion for the freedwoman Acte, it is likely that it was encouraged by 
Burrus and Seneca. Tacitus writes that he was unopposed by even „the older friends‟ of the 
princeps, who preferred him to vent his lust in this harmless way rather than debauch noble 
women.
535
 Therefore among these „older friends‟ may have been Burrus and Seneca as is indicated 
in the passage quoted above. Further, Tacitus writes: „Be that as it may, the powerfulness of his 
mother was gradually broken.‟536 This indicates that she did not have the power over Nero that his 
Praetorian Prefect had, nor did she have the support of the Praetorian Prefect. Tacitus shows that he 
approves of the means used by Seneca and Burrus to control Nero, though he has to admit that in 
the end they failed when they could not prevent him from instigating the Juvenalia.
537
 They limited 
the damage though, by confining Nero to singing. 
That Seneca and Burrus had a close working relationship is shown by Tacitus when he relates that 
charges were brought by Paris against Burrus. The princeps then resolved to remove Burrus from 
the prefecture on the grounds that he had been appointed by Agrippina. Tacitus claims that Burrus 
was saved by Seneca.
538
 Here he shows that there was a reliance of these two men upon each other 
in the performance of their duties, a fact that is made obvious when, according to Tacitus, the death 
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of Burrus led to the decline in Seneca‟s power.539 During the life of Agrippina, Tacitus depicts a 
court rife with dissent, with animosity growing between the emperor and his mother, and where the 
Prefect of the Praetorian Guard was a central figure.  In the trial of Agrippina in 55, Burrus is not 
shown in his capacity of the Prefect of the Praetorian Guard but as an inquisitor. This was the first 
use of such power by the Prefect of the guard.
540
   
Tacitus, as has been noted, portrayed Burrus as an honourable man. However Burrus must have had 
knowledge of Nero‟s intent to poison Britannicus. Having turned against Agrippina, it is likely that 
he was deeply in Nero‟s confidence. Further a tribune of the Praetorian Guard who had control of a 
poisoner, Locusta, was employed in the business and was threatened by Nero when the first attempt 
failed. This use of a tribune of the Guard could not have been done without the knowledge of 
Burrus. Seneca knew that Nero had murdered his brother. Tacitus has him mention it at the time of 
his death.
541
 The fact that Tacitus does not connect Burrus with this attempt hints that Tacitus is 
attempting to preserve the blameless character of the Guard commander who was the colleague of 
Tacitus‟ admired Seneca. Despite evidence to the contrary, Tacitus is presenting the two men as 
being a united front against the evils that he perceives in Agrippina‟s and Nero‟ actions. Burrus and 
Seneca shared the responsibility of the early years of Nero‟s reign. It would have been unseemly to 
have depicted Burrus as being personally involved in poisoning Claudius‟ son.  
Tacitus attempts to cover up Burrus‟ involvement in the murder of Agrippina by showing him 
opposed to the Guards being used to murder her. He writes, after the failed attempt in the 
collapsible boat: „Unless there was hope in Seneca and Burrus. He had summoned them 
immediately to test their feeling, it being doubtful whether they were ignorant even before this.‟542 
However, when Nero approached Burrus and Seneca, Burrus replied to a question put to him by 
Seneca as to whether the Praetorian Guard could be used to accomplish the task replied in the 
negative. He said that the Guard were bound to the whole house of the Caesars and mindful of 
Germanicus would not venture anything frightful against his progeny.
543
 Burrus‟ suggestion that 
Anicetus complete the act shows that Burrus was aware of the earlier attempt. Tacitus‟ loyal and 
upright Praetorian Prefect was not above condoning the murder of his benefactress, provided it was 
not at his hands. Griffin‟s claim that the behaviour of Seneca and Burrus in this incident jolted 
Nero‟s confidence in them is open to doubt, since Tacitus does not report any deterioration in their 
power in the state, other than their inability to prevent Nero from undertaking more open forms of 
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debauchery.
544
 This could be accounted for by the death of Agrippina herself, who, while out of 
favour may have been a check on Nero. In fact Tacitus‟ Burrus has the Guards sycophantically 
congratulate Nero on his escape from his mother‟s schemes.545 
Burrus‟ death in 62 was the turning point in Tacitus‟ account of Nero‟s reign. As Gillis writes, 
Tacitus reports the death of Burrus with genuine regret, just as he reports what he sees as the 
hypocrisy of Nero.
546
  Tacitus records: „Burrus took leave of life; whether through ill health or 
poison being uncertain‟ (incertum valetudine an veneno).547 Tacitus makes use of words such as 
incertum and an when he wants to present two alternatives, while preferring the reader to accept the 
second of the two.
548
 That Tacitus expects the reader to take the second view is obvious as he goes 
on to explain that Nero had given him some noxious ointment. Tacitus says that this was believed 
by the majority of people.
549
 This view is further enhanced by the apparently cold reply of Burrus to 
Nero‟s enquiries into his health: „I am well‟ (ego me bene habeo).550 The reader is left in no doubt 
that it was Tacitus‟ view that Burrus was poisoned. Afranius Burrus‟ manner of death furthers 
Tacitus‟ antipathetic view of Nero in the Annals, and to demonstrate the problems that he saw in the 
principate as a whole, where an honest and loyal servant of the state could be murdered by a 
depraved princeps. 
As Tacitus portrays it, the death of Burrus and the appointment of Ofonius Tigellinus might be 
regarded as the point at which Nero‟s reign took a turn for the worse, in the same way that the rise 
of Sejanus signalled the turning point of Tiberius‟ reign. However Tigellinus‟ rise is not placed in a 
structurally important point as was the case with Sejanus‟ rise at the beginning of book four, which 
is in the middle of the Tiberian Hexad.
551
  In book four Tacitus writes of Sejanus: „later by various 
means he shackled Tiberius to such an extent that the latter dark as he was towards others was 
rendered uniquely unguarded and unprotected in respect of Sejanus himself.‟552  On the rise of 
Tigellinus under Nero, Tacitus writes: „The death of Burrus broke Seneca‟s powerfulness, because 
good practice lacked its previous strength with the removal of one (so to speak) of its two leaders, 
and Nero was all for inclining toward baser men.‟553  Tacitus obviously saw Tigellinus as one of 
those baser men. In Tacitus‟ account, Sejanus is clearly the model for Tigellinus and by making the 
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comparison Tacitus increases the tension in the reign.
554
 Further, Tacitus, by making out Tigellinus 
to be completely malevolent represents the very rottenness of Nero‟s reign both in a political and 
moral sense.
555
 Tacitus is then able to portray the reign as the triumph of decadence.
556
 
Tacitus furthers his comparisons between Tigellinus and Sejanus as he writes: „Ofonius Tigellinus, 
of whose inveterate immorality and infamy he [Nero] had been a follower.‟557 Syme describes 
Ofonius Tigellinus as the open, shameful and pretentious man who ousted Seneca. He also surmises 
that behind this were men of superior birth, rank and talent.
558
 In his Histories, Tacitus describes 
Tigellinus as a man of humble birth, vicious childhood and dissolute maturity.
559
 Here we have a 
similar situation to that which Tacitus saw in the savagery of Sejanus, the man who found his way 
to the consulship by means other than through the sanctioned cursus honorum which rankled with 
Tacitus. Similarly, in the promotion of Tigellinus, Tacitus saw a man of relative unimportance, 
bringing about the downfall of Seneca, a man Tacitus admired and who he considered superior. 
Tacitus attempts to show Nero‟s reign as a mirror of that of Tiberius. It was at Nero‟s behest that 
Tigellinus was appointed to the prefecture of the Praetorian Guard in 62 as it was Tiberius who 
raised Sejanus. Cassius Dio wrote that Tigellinus was a mere appendage of Nero, because he was 
always with him.
560
 In Tacitus Tigellinus is also depicted, like Sejanus, as attached to the emperor 
and divorced from the Guard itself. Hence the impression given in Tacitus is that Tigellinus was the 
emperor‟s partner in his debaucheries, just as Sejanus was accused of being involved in the vices of 
Tiberius. Tacitus shows the different influences in Nero‟s reign as he did with that of Tiberius: 
firstly there had initially been the dominance of Agrippina just as in the beginning of Tiberius‟ reign 
there had been Livia, Germanicus and Drusus; then came the dominance of Seneca and Burrus, as 
in Tiberius‟ reign there was the period before the death of Tiberius‟ son, Drusus; and finally the 
domination of the „malevolent‟ prefect Tigellinus just as Sejanus had taken control under Tiberius. 
Tigellinus, however, never held the power that Sejanus held and Nero never called him „his partner 
in his toils‟ (socium laborum) as Tiberius did Sejanus.561 The most Tacitus could say of Tigellinus 
was that he was one of Nero‟s councillors when he was in a savage mood (saevienti). Sejanus could 
endow his adherents with senatorial offices.
562
 Tigellinus is simply seen as carrying out the orders 
of the emperor. He is portrayed as a bully, as when he tortured Octavia‟s maids, but in no sense 
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does he take part in the functions of government as had Sejanus. Tacitus has taken another emperor 
he sees as „bad‟ and placed with him an equally „bad‟ Praetorian prefect, in effect producing a 
weaker equivalent of Tiberius‟ reign. Tigellinus though did not hold the political clout that Sejanus 
had. Sejanus could award magistracies and consulships, but Tigellinus had no such power, so the 
comparison falls short of what Tacitus intended.  
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion therefore may be reached that Tacitus used the Praetorian prefects to reflect his own 
views of the emperors themselves. In the reigns of Tiberius and Nero the prefects are presented as 
evil and having adverse effects on the emperors. In contrast, during the reigns of Claudius and 
Nero, Burrus is presented as the only prefect having a positive effect through his partnership with 
Seneca who was much admired by Tacitus. The Prefects are also used to mark definite phases in the 
reigns of the emperors. Sejanus is introduced in the middle of the Tiberian Hexad where it is 
Tacitus belief that Tiberius‟ reign began to deteriorate. Claudius‟ reign is divided into two sections, 
the first of which features the influence of Messalina in supplanting the Praetorian Prefects and 
secondly the influence of Agrippina which caused the rise of Burrus. The continuation of Burrus as 
Praetorian Prefect under Nero was the time of good government but his death enabled the elevation 
of Tigellinus.  
Thus Tacitus depicts the Praetorian Guard, an innovation of the Augustan principate, as a military 
force inflicted on the population of Rome by the emperors under whom they served.
 563
 The 
Prefects, beginning with Sejanus take on powerful roles in the rule of each emperor. This is a move 
that Tacitus sees as sinister. They are involved politically in the events in Rome and thereby gain 
elevation beyond that normally held by the Praetorian Prefect. Only Afranius Burrus under Nero 
escapes the overall disapproval with which Tacitus presents the Prefects. Tacitus further uses the 
Praetorian Guard and its Prefects to show the sycophancy of the Senate, a problem which is a 
dominant theme of the Annals.
564
 Tacitus shows the Praetorian Guard in the Annals as the 
emperors‟ means of inflicting servitium and limiting libertas in Rome and reducing the senate and 
people to servitium. In this way, Tacitus gives a negative impression of the principate as a whole. 
To Tacitus, the principate was an institution that supported the emperors‟ use of the Praetorian 
Guard as agents of intimidation, and the rise to high office of men whom he considered unworthy, 
men such as Sejanus and Tigellinus.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
THE PORTRAYAL OF GENERALS AND ARMIES IN TACITUS’ ANNALS. 
 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to show that Tacitus uses the generals and the Roman army 
to reflect his own views on the principates of the Julio-Claudian emperors, the era covered by his 
Annals. In doing so, I have shown that Tacitus gives his opinions of the principate as an institution 
and that the generals and the army were part of the arsenal of literary devices that he had at hand to 
underline his views. In Tacitus‟ opinion the principate was not a system to be desired but it was 
unavoidable in the current political climate. Tacitus, in fact, makes it clear in his Annals that he 
admired the Republic and held an idealistic view of that long extinct regime. The army served as a 
convenient conduit through which Tacitus could illustrate his opinions on the political situation in 
Rome under the emperors, in contrast with that of the Republic. 
Tacitus had had military experience himself and was in a position to use his sources to good effect 
when relating the affairs of the generals and the armies. Through careful use of language he 
compared and contrasted them with affairs in Rome and the actions of the emperors themselves. 
This was often done to the detriment of the annalistic format that he had set himself, since res 
internae sometimes affected res externae to the extent that dating was often confused as in the war 
against Tacfarinas in Africa. As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, Tacitus used the 
army as a political weapon with which to judge the affairs of those in charge of the empire. For 
example, Germanicus‟ settlement of the Rhine mutiny and his German campaigns are exploited by 
Tacitus to portray Tiberius in a very hostile way and to show the tension within the ruling family. 
This literary device gives substance to the charges that Tacitus makes against an emperor that he 
obviously disliked. Claudius and Nero are also judged through comparison with the actions of the 
armies and the Praetorian Guard. Claudius is depicted as subject to his wife Agrippina, who courts 
the favours of the Praetorian Guard while Nero‟s debauchery is a fine contrast to the discipline of 
Corbulo‟s legions as they won battles in the east. The use of O‟Gorman‟s concept of „false 
appearance and hidden truth‟ that underlines much of Tacitus‟ writing, provides a helpful 
framework for examining the subtext of Tacitus‟ account of the wars, the generals and the army.565 
Tacitus does provide „hidden meanings‟ beneath the surface of his account which give the careful 
reader an insight into Tacitus‟ real attitude towards emperors and their regimes. Tacitus‟ account of 
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successful generals and victorious armies on campaign invites unflattering comparisons with the 
principes in Rome.  
Tacitus‟ conception of Roman imperial government was coloured by his experiences under 
Domitian and this influenced his depiction of reigns of the Julio-Claudians. This was the embryonic 
stage of the new institution of the principate, and Tacitus, through his careful description of the 
wars that occurred during this period traces for us development of this new institution. As has been 
discussed, the armies were engaged during this period with the mutinies in Pannonia and on the 
Rhine, a period which highlighted the instability of the early principate after the death of Augustus, 
then the revolts by Florus and Sacrovir in Gaul, an insurrection by Tacfarinas in North Africa, the 
revolt of Boudica in Britain and the warlike situation in Armenia in the east. These were all utilised 
by Tacitus to highlight the development of the principate as each military action occurred. In 
addition, the various phases of the wars provided interesting res externae that contrasted with the 
res internae which Tacitus portrayed as sorrowful.
566
 Tacitus‟ overall opinion of the Julio-Claudian 
emperors is negative and he is especially hostile in the cases of Tiberius and Nero. Further as has 
been shown, Tacitus‟ criticism is not reserved for the emperors, but also for the senate, which he 
saw as sycophantic and subservient.  Therefore he found the situation in Rome mournful and his 
Annals in need of exciting events to enliven his story. Tacitus felt that he lacked the great political 
material that the Republican writers had recourse to, writers such as Livy, Cicero and Sallust. 
Tacitus has replaced this lack of stimulation in Roman politics in the Annals by highlighting the 
actions of the generals, the armies and their various wars. 
Tacitus‟ value as an historian has been called into question by a number of modern scholars and he 
has even been likened to the poets by Woodman. Martin and Syme by contrast claim that he is a 
reliable historian. These are important points to consider in any work on Tacitus‟ Annals, and will 
engage the interest of scholars for many years. It is up to the individual reader to decide if one 
follows the extreme view of those who believe that Tacitus „made things up‟, or take view that 
Tacitus is fundamentally reliable.
 567
 Tacitus though does have a claim to a certain degree of 
reliability and it has been shown that Tacitus has utilised the actions of the generals and the army 
with a view to outlining the emerging principate. In doing so he quite forcefully gives his own 
views on the individual emperors. Just as the amiable Germanicus was a foil for Tacitus‟ dark 
portrayal of Tiberius, Corbulo, the self-disciplined commander of the Parthian campaigns is the foil 
for Tacitus hostile portrait of a self-indulgent Nero. The excellence of the generals is shown as 
opposed to the viciousness of the principes. Tacitus‟ accounts of the generals, the armies and the 
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actions in which they fought therefore, should be seen to varying degrees as literary constructions 
intended to indicate his own ambivalence with respect to the emperors and the principate as a 
whole.  
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